DAWODU.COM

Dedicated to Nigeria's socio-political issues

2009 US DIVERSITY VISA LOTTERY INFORMATION

October 3, 2007 - December 2, 2007

LUNARPAGES.COM and IPOWERWEB.COM - Despicable WebHosts - Read My Story

Quick Kill in Slow Motion:

The Nigerian Civil War

Major Michael R. Stafford, USA

April 2, 1984

Marine Corps Command and Staff College,

Marine Corps Development and Education Command,

Quantico, Virginia 22134

source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/SMR.htm

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe my sincere appreciation and gratitutde to the many

professionals who assisted and encouraged me during the

production of this paper. First, Lieutenant Colonel William

Isom, Director of African Studies, National War College, and

Lieutenant Colonel William Hubard, USA, Major Mary Becka,

USA, and Dr. William Stoakley (all of the Defense

Intelligence Agency), gave their time, considerable

expertise, and recommendations to the direction of this work.

Second, Lieutenant Colonel Musa Bitiyong, Nigerian Army,

provided substance to my research through his correspondence.

Finally, I need also acknowledge Lieutenant Colonel

Donald Bittner, USMC, Mrs. Mary Porter, the Reference

Librarian at Breckinridge Library, and Mrs. Marvella McDill,

Lieutenant Colonel Bittner's encouragement was substantial,

and he painstakingly edited the first draft of this

manuscript. Mrs. Porter amazed me with her dexterity in

obtaining relatively scarce documents which were used in the

research for this paper. Mrs. McDill diligently and

cheerfully typed this document.

To each of these kind people, I offer my thanks.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Maps

I Africa iii

II Nigeria iv

III Nigerian Regions-January 1967 v

IV Midwestern Invasion, August-September 1967 vi

V Status, October 1968 vii

VI Airlift, November 1968 viii

VII Biafra, May 30, 1969 ix

VIII Final Collapse, December 1969-January 1970 x

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER

I ROOTS OF CONFLICT 5

Pre-War History 5

The Nigerian Military 10

The Ibo Experience 16

II THE COMBATANT FORCES 20

The Federal Side 20

The Rebel Forces 26

III THE WAR BEGINS 30

Initial Phase (June-July 1967) 30

The Midwestern Invasion (August-September

1967) 35

IV THE WAR DEVELOPS 43

The Influence of Gowon 43

1 Division Operations 45

2 Division Operations 50

3 Marine Commando Division Operations 54

V OJUKWU'S BIAFRA 62

IV TO THE END OF THE WAR (SEPTEMBER 1968-

JANUARY 1970) 71

VII THE AIR WAR 80

The Rebel Air Force 80

The Federal Air Force 86

VIII CONCLUSIONS 90

END NOTES 97

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 107

APPENDICES

A. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 113

B. LIST OF PROMINENT PERSONS 115

Click here to view image

INTRODUCTION

The Nigerian Civil War marked a significant milestone in

the military history of independent Black Africa. For the

first time, 20th Century technology reached a battlefield

where Black African met Black African in conventional combat.

The expansion of capabilities, from the chaotic

spears-and-knives of the Congo to the set piece, automatic-

rifles-and-jet-airplanes of Nigeria, introduced new

dimensions in devastation to Africa south of the Sahara.

The premise of this paper is that a study of the

Nigerian Civil War offers the opportunity to understand how

the introduction of sophisticated weapons affects the combat

capabilities and actions of the military in the developing

countries of the world. The quantities of modern weapons in

the Nigerian-Biafran conflict were not substantial, but their

impact was great. There were no tanks or heavy artillery

(122mm Russian Guns were the largest), so the individual

battle lethality can not compare to the Arab-Israeli

conflicts or other technology-intensive campaigns. However,

the Nigerian Civil War caused the deaths of hundreds of

thousands of people, primarily through the starvation

associated with seige warfare. In the end this war proved as

unjust and deadly as war can become. Those who suffered the

most were once again the very young and the very old.

Much has been written about the Nigerian Civil War.

There are many fine histories detailing the development of

the country and the factors which led to the Civil War of

1967 to 1970. For this reason, this paper only capsulizes

this information. Likewise, there is only limited space

expended here to review the Nigerian military's evolution,

growth and eventual initiation of two 1966 coups d'etat which

proved to be immediate causes of the Nigerian Civil War.

Robin Luckham thoroughly analyzes this subject in his book,

The Nigerian Military (Cambridge: University Press, 1971).

Other areas which have received considerable analysis

include international politics and foreign intervention, the

relief efforts and the implications of the policy of

starvation, the economics of civil war, and the propaganda

war waged within the civil war itself. Because of the wide

range of information available on these topics, I selected an

area of research more directly related to my profession--the

analysis of the military campaign.

This paper is not a detailed history of the war in

Nigeria. Rather, selected battles and campaigns are

discussed and analyzed based on their significance to the

outcome of the war, their edification of certain lessons of

the conflict, or their benefit in illustrating points

regarding the development of the forces involved or the war

itself. In all cases, effort has been exerted to use written

accounts from actual participants and observers, especially

military personnel, in formulating analysis of the subject

events. This proved necessary for two reasons. The first

was the propaganda war mentioned above. Press releases from

the two sides were so distorted that the New York Times, for

example, ran adjacent Biafran and Nigerian sourced stories.

The other reason is the bias exhibited by foreign

correspondents covering the war. On the Nigerian side,

access to the war zone was extremely limited since the

military controlled the movements of journalists, thus

effectively censuring much information. The Biafrans allowed

freer movement by the media, seeking every advantage in

courting world opinion. This often resulted in the co-opting

of journalists. As Frederick Forsyth noted about his

perspective, if "I may be accused of presenting the Biafra

case, this would not be without justification. It [his book]

is the Biafra story, and it is told from the Biafran

standpoint."(1)

Realizing that participants may have reputations at

stake, multiple accounts of individual incidents were a must.

This has been possible in most cases, since Biafran and

Nigerian versions of most episodes were available.

After assembling the military analyses of the selected

battles and campaigns, a summary of historical factors

leading up to the Civil War was compiled to aid the reader in

understanding the content of the conflict. This is found in

Chapter One. Finally, a brief summary of conclusions is

provided as the final chapter to highlight the most

significant aspects of the Nigerian Civil War.

For those interested in further reading or study on the

details of the Nigeria-Biafra conflict, the bibliography has

been annotated with this writer's comments on the content and

value of each listing to this research. It is important to

note that readings should be balanced between authors of

Biafran and Nigerian perspectives.

CHAPTER 1

ROOTS OF CONFLICT

Understanding the nature of the Nigerian Civil War

begins with a knowledge of the unique and complex factors

which led to the secession of Biafra and subsequent open

hostilities. By their nature, these causes drew worldwide

attention to the potential redivisions of Black African

boundaries along traditional cultural, tribal and

geographical lines. (The Organization of African Unity

attempted to avoid the possible disintegration of its states

into conflict and civil war by establishing in its 1963

charter the policy of keeping the national boundaries drawn

by the former colonial powers.) Later in this chapter, I

shall examine how the military in Nigeria was shaped and

driven by these influences and as an institution contributed

to the chaos that ended as civil war.

Pre-War History. Nigeria is the most populous country

in Africa. At the start of the civil war in 1967, she

possessed about 56 million inhabitants. Most of these people

belonged to one of three tribes--the Northern Hausa--Fulani,

the Western Yoruba, or the Eastern Ibo. The West and East

are collectively called "The South."

Before the imposition of European influence in the 19th

Century, these tribes shared little common experience. They

were separated geographically. The Northern Hausa-Fulani

tribes were situated in dry savannahs south of the Sahara and

accessible to the influences of the Mediterranean region,

especially Islam. City states there developed under the rule

of powerful emirs and the Islamic religion took root.

The Yoruba in the West maintained more contact with the

North than did the Eastern tribes, due to their highly

developed trading activities and moderately open territory.

Urban dwellers, the Yoruba were divded into states, each

centered on a city. The tribe was industrious; crafts were

numerous; and the religion complex due to interaction with

many outside cultures. The relative sophistication of

Yoruban society helped it withstand the trauma of European

rule.(1)

The Ibo of the Eastern region were initially quite

different from the hard-working, intelligent people that

developed after the arrival of the British. Isolated in the

dense, wet woodlands of the Niger Delta, the Ibo lacked the

sophistication of the Yoruba or the coastal minority tribes.

In contrast, the originally backward Ibo emerged from the

British colonial period as the most westernized tribe,

espousing Christianity (as did some Yoruba) and proving

adaptable to the imported work ethic due to their initiative

and vigor.(2)

Having earlier exploited the Niger area slave trade,

Britain decided to stop it in the early 19th Century. First

the Royal Navy patrolled the coastal waters with vessels

controlled from a consulate set up on Fernando Po, a Spanish

island possession 150 miles southeast of the Niger River

Delta. In 1861 Britain claimed control of Lagos with the

goal of ending the slave trading which originated at that

port. Having established a mainland foothold, British

influence gradually reached further inland.(3) The Oil

Rivers Protectorate was established in (what is now) Southern

Nigeria to administer traders doing business in that region,

and the Niger Company was chartered to trade in the Niger

River Basin.

By 1885, when Bismarch called the Berlin Conference.

Britain was firmly established in Nigeria. As was the

purpose of the conference, Africa was divided among the

European nations into spheres of influence. This division

was made wholly on the competitive political situations in

Europe and did not take into account those factors on which

western nation-states had historically been built.

Geographical and cultural influences such as natural

boundaries, tribal locations and tribal differences were

totally ignored. With the acceleration of British

involvement, this set the stage for the artificial fusion of

three distinctly different populations.

In 1886 the National African Company (also known as the

Royal Niger Company) was granted a royal charter to oversee

the territories north of Oil Rivers Protectorate; by 1893

this had become the Niger Coast Protectorate. The National

African Company was empowered to establish a police force and

provide government services in the north.

In 1897 the kingdom of Benin was brought under British

control. After the annexation of other southwest areas, the

Protectorate of Southern Nigeria was established in 1900. In

the same year, the charter of the National African Company

was revoked and the North redesigned the Protectorate of

Northern Nigeria. The two southern protectorates were united

in 1906, and by 1914 the British consolidated control over

all of Nigeria. What had in fact happened was the joining of

three different foreign administrative organizations rather

than the unification of three different indigenous

peoples.(4)

The first governor of the unified Nigeria was Frederick

Dealtry Lugard, 1st Baron Lugard. He introduced in Nigeria

the system of indirect rule, in which local government was

essentially delegated in toto to tribal chiefs or indigenous

ruling bodies. These local authorities acted under the

supervision, or more accurately in many cases, the advice of

British administrators. In Nigeria, this allowed the

continuation of strong regional political differences.

Little progress occurred in Nigeria until the end of

World War II, when nationalistic movements surfaced in Africa

as well as much of the rest of the colonial world. This was

actually part of the unrest in the European empires as

peoples in various areas sought to remove outside rule from

their homes. Powerful political parties developed n each

sector of the country. Chief Awolowo founded the Action

Group in the West. However, the old city-states remained,

dividing the West between local and regional interests. The

East saw the formation of a single democratic party, the

National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC). The

theme of this party, which was led by Dr. Azikiwe, was

national unity--the formation of a single, powerful

independent state. The Northern emirs responded to the

growing political awareness in the South by submerging their

region in the "designedly local and monolithic" Northern

Peoples Congress.(5)

With British assistance, these three regions negotiated

a constitutional government which resulted in the loosely

constituted federation established when independence was

achieved in October of 1960. In this federation, two of the

three parties had to form a coalition to gain control of the

government. Incredibly, the Ibo of the East who advocated a

strong federal union and the more conservative Northerners

who favored a weak confederation united.(6) Dr. Azikiwe

became President and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of the North was

named Prime Minister.

The Westerners, as oddman out, vented their frustration

in a division of their party between Awolowo and his

followers, and local party segments led by Western Regional

Premier Akintola. Akintola's faction aligned with the North,

and formed the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), while the

other factions united with the Eastern Ibo to establish the

United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA).

Open hostility in the West resulted in Federal

intervention, under strange circumstances, and the discovery

of "immense defalestions of regional revenues into party

funds and private hands"(7). Awolowo was tried, convicted

and imprisoned for treason, and his rival, Akintola, gained

power based on his alignment with the Northern Party.

Civil unrest was increased by other incidents during

this time. The 1962 census results were released in 1963 and

showed a total Nigerian population of 55.6 million people, of

which 29.8 million were identified as living in the Northern

Region. This outright majority caused other regions to

vehemently discount the accuracy of the census.

As the 1964 parlimentary elections neared, corruption

was rife. Local political activity was marked by

intimidation, and cheating was rampant, especially in the

North. The UPGA boycotted the elections, but later accepted

a second election in 1965 and garnered about a fourth of the

seats. In that year the events surrounding the Western

Regional legislative election bordered on civil war. Clashes

between Akintola's NNA and the UPGA brought about many deaths

and recorded another episode in the headlong tumble from

independence to civil war (8).

The Nigerian Military. Into this cauldron of seething

historical, political and cultural antagonism stepped the

military in the first coup attempt of January 1966. The

discord between regions was based on tribal differences

accentuated by religious and social disparities. The

military, as an institution, was intertwined with these

contradictions and could not act independently from the rest

of Nigerian society. Hence, instead of stabilizing the

country, the armed forces led it to civil war with a coup in

Jaunary 1966 and a counter-coup in July of the same year.

Former military ruler Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo

maintained that these coups were the immediate causes of the

Nigerian Civil War. He has noted that the political equation

was altered, and the fragile trust existing among the three

major tribes was shattered.(9)

But the military lacked the size to control Nigeria. At

the time of the first coup, Nigerian forces totaled only

10,500. The Army was the largest with 9,000 soldiers. The

Navy numbered 900, including 80 officers, and the newly

formed Air Force boasted about 700 men. In a country more

than twice the size of California, the military was spread

too thinly and was without the training, equipment and

sophistication to suitably dominant Nigeria's vast area and

population. Additionally, this small organization

reverberated with the ethnic turmoil confronting the rest of

the country which further reduced its ability to handle the

civil strife.

The Nigerian Army traced its roots back to the West

African Frontier Force created in the late 19th Century by

the chartered companies to administer their respective

regions.(10) By 1914 this force included a Gold Coast

Regiment, the Sierra Leone Battalion and a Gambia Company.

In that year, Nigerian and Gold Coast (Ghana) units fought in

Togoland against the Germans there, and a detachment of

British Colonial forces and a French Senegalese unit

campaigned in the German Cameroons.(11) In Accra, the

British established the West Africa Command to exercise

command and control of its regional colonial units. It

remained until 1956, when it was disbanded because Ghana

gained independence and desired its own army, thus forcing

the break up of the Regional Force.(12)

About 30,000 Nigerians served with the British Forces in

World War II. The 81 and 82 (West Africa) Divisions included

Nigerian soldiers who saw action in Burma. Nigerian troops

also served with the Royal West African Frontier Force in

Ethiopia against the Italians, and later Nigerian units

served with British units in Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Palestine

and Sicily. Allied commanders were reportedly generous in

their praise of Nigeria's soldiers and units.(13)

Until independence the Nigerian Army consisted of

recruits essentially from the lower levels of Nigerian

society, with a high concentration of minority tribe members.

The officer corps was predominately British with a gradual,

slow transition to "Nigerianization" from 1949 to 1964.

Ethnic politics delayed the announcement of a Nigerian

Commander of the Army until 1965 when Major General Johnson

A. Ironsi, an Ibo, was given that position.

After independence, military service gained prestige,

and the more educated Southerners, particularly Ibo, began to

enlist in increasing numbers. With decreasing British

funding, the Nigerians were forced to escalate military

spending. The armed forces which before received little

interest (14) became a matter of national pride and pressures

to expand the military size became a popular issue.(15) In

1958 the Nigerian military numbered 7,600 officers and men.

By 1964 it had increased by 2,900. Growth in the Navy and a

relatively ambitious Air Force program accounted for much of

this expansion.

Quota systems were implemented in 1958 for the enlisted

ranks and in 1961 for the officer grades to balance service

compositions with national regional demographics. These two

efforts served to highlight tribal differences within and

politicize the small military. Along with the Nigerianiza-

tion of the Officer Corps (see Table I), the quota system

thoroughly confused the dynamics of officer development. The

rapid influx of officers created an age imbalance and a

professional gap. Promotion rates accelerated, especially

for officers commissioned before 1960. An officer accessed

at age 20, could be a lieutenant colonal at 31. When the

Click here to view image

officer ranks began to stabilize in 1965 after all the

British officers had departed, younger officers became

frustrated because of slower promotion rates.(16) This

frustration may have found outlets in political action, first

by the "Majors' Coup" in January 1966 followed by the

counter-"Captains' Coup" the following July. The most direct

impact of these two coups on the Nigerian military was the

destruction of the command structure and the polarization of

the forces along two lines, basically Ibo and non-Ibo (the

first coup was planned and executed by a predominately Ibo

group of officers, while the second coup was led by non-Ibo

officers; this served to create a mutual suspicion). The

loss of relatively experienced officers (see Table II) would

prove particularily damaging to the Federal side in the Civil

War because of the migration of middle grade Ibo officers to

Biafra.

The impact of the coups was even more devastating to the

country as a whole. The early coup destroyed the delicate

first republic. Though the coup was organized to end

corruption throughout the Nigerian political system, the net

effect only placed the military in power, while the

corruption found a way to continue. It in fact was a

standard justification for subsequent coups, cited in

military takeovers in 1975 and as recently as January 1984.

In a British TV interview, the leader of the January 1966

coup, Major Chukwumah Nzeogwu stated,

We wanted to get rid of rotten and corrupt

ministers, political parties, trades unions and the

whole clumsy apparatus of the federal system. We

wanted to gun down all the bigwigs on our way.

This was the only way. We could not afford to let

them live if this was to work. We got some but not

all. General Ironsi was to have been shot, but we

were not ruthless enough. As a result he and the

other compromisers were able to supplant us.(19)

Instead of ending the corruption, the coups triggered

hostilities which blanketed the country in civil war and

forced the rapid expansion of the military. But the Nigerian

military could not provide the stability to serve as a

unifying institution for an oil-rich emerging power in Black

Africa.

The Ibo Experience. A final point needs to be made

regarding the animosity toward the Ibo. In their acceptance

of European values and the Christian religion, the Ibo

further differentiated themselves from the other tribes of

Nigeria, particularly those of the North. The Ibo proved

themselves intelligent, ambitious and conscientious. These

traits enabled the Ibo to capitalize on educational

opportunities and saw them dominate administrative

organizations, like the civil service and similar positions

in industry. They did especially well on the General

Qualification Examination for Officer Placement in the

military, due to their higher education level.(20) This

eventually became a factor in the establishment of a regional

quota system for officer recruitment, so as to achieve an

ethnic balance in the armed forces.

Resentment built up among the other tribes of the near

Ibo monopoly of the skilled professions and white collar

jobs. Old tribal prejudices were aggravated by the belief

that the Ibo were trying to dominate Nigeria. The coup of

January 1966, instigated by Ibo majors, led to the death of

the key non-Ibo leaders in the country and, though apparently

unplanned, placed Ibo General Ironsi in power. After an

initial period of relief at the believed end of corruption,

doubts formed among the non-Ibo population and a fear

developed that the coup was another step in an Ibo plan to

control the country.

Hundreds of Ibo were massacred in May 1966 in a backlash

to the coup. General Ironsi had failed to take positive

steps to stabilize the political situation by harshly

punishing the plotters, most of whom were jailed

indefinitely. The appearance of complicity and the growing

nationwide unrest created the climate for the counter-coup in

July 1966; this coup was initiated by non-Ibo company grade

officers. Ironsi was brutally slain and his Chief of Staff,

Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu "Jack" Gowon, was a compromise

choice as his replacement. Gowon was the senior Northern

officer serving in the Army at the time; however, his choice

created some interesting aspects since he was Christian, from

a middle belt minority tribe, and had been hitherto

relatively obscure.

The second coup saw the directed movement of troops and

troop units to the regions of their respective ethnic

heritage. The exodus of Ibo to the Eastern Region grew and,

increasingly, that region in a de facto sense partitioned

itself from the rest of Nigeria. Led by Lieutentant Colonel

Chukwuemeka O. Ojukwu, like Gowow a British-trained combat

officer, the Eastern Region slowly emerged as the safe haven

homeland of the Ibo peoples. In October of 1966, despite

Gowon's declaration that the Ibo would be protected, pograms

and rioting resulted in the mutilation and death of thousands

of Ibo and a mass flight to the Eastern Region by a million

and a half Ibo. This October 14, 1966 Time eyewitness

account indicates the terror of that period:

...A Lagos-bound jet had just arrived from

London, and as the Kano passengers were escorted

into the customs shed, a wild-eyed soldier stormed

in, brandishing a rifle and demanding, 'Ina

Nyammari?'--Hausa for 'Where are the damned Ibos?'

There were Ibo among the customs officials, and

they dropped their chalk and fled, only to be shot

down in the main terminal by other soldiers.

Screaming their bloody curses of a Moslem holy war,

the Hausa troops turned the airport into a

shambles, bayoneting Ibo worders in the bar,

gunning them down in the corridors, and hauling Ibo

passengers off the plane to be lined up and shot.

From the airport the troops fanned out through

downtown Kano, hunting down Ibos in bars, hotels

and on the streets. One contingent drove their

Land Rover to the rail road station where more than

100 Ibos were waiting for a train, and cut them

down with automatic fire.

The soldiers did not have to do all the

killing. They were soon joined by thousands of

Hausa civilians, who rampaged through the city

armed with stones, cutlasses, machetes, and

homemade weapons of metal and broken glass. Crying

'Heathen!' and 'Allah!!' the mobs and troops

invaded the sabon gari (strangers' quarter),

ransacking, looting and burning Ibo homes and

stores and murdering their owners.

...All night long and into the morning the

massacre went on. Then tired but fulfilled, the

Hausas drifted back to their homes and barracks to

get some breakfast and sleep. Municipal garbage

trucks were sent out to collect the dead and dump

them into mass graves outside the city...:(21)

The fear of extermination built out of such incidents was the

foundation of the will to resist a vastly superior force

throughout the Civil War. The Ibo nurtured fear in their enclave

of Eastern Nigeria with the resulting belief that only secession

and the formation of a separate country would ensure their

security and safety. On May 30, 1967. Ojukwu cast aside Gowon's

continuing efforts to maintain a federal government and proclaimed

the formation of the independent Republic of Biafra.

The resulting Civil War lasted over two and half years.

The cost in human life has been estimated as high as two million

people, and Nigeria's expanding oil-based economy simmered when

its unimpeded growth could have raised the country to a position

of international responsibility unparalled in Black Africa.

CHAPTER 2

THE COMBATANT FORCES

The Federal Side. When war broke out, the Nigerian

military was beset with numerous problems. The Army was not

totally inexperienced, having sent two battalions with the

United Nations Peacekeeping Force to the Congo between 1960

and 1964 and a smaller force to Tanzania later for a similar

peacekeeping mission. But the small 10,000-man Army that

existed in 1966 was wrecked by the divisiveness of the tribal

strife. Many senior leaders were killed during the two

coups, and the migration of Ibo to the East resulted in the

loss of more experienced officers and NCOs. According to one

source, the Federals were able to claim about 184 officers

while the Biafrans had 93 at the start of the war.(1) The

difficulties of selection, training and development of

officers, including the distorted promotion schedules and age

structures (note that the military head of the country,

Lieutenant Colonel Gowon, was 32 years of age at the outbreak

of the war), were outgrowths of the rapid expansion of the

Army to 80,000 at the end of 1967 (2) and more than 200,000

by the end of the war. Battalions were formed with 5 or 6

(vice 30+) officers in late 1967. The resulted in tentative

command and control and rudimentary staff work.(3)

The seeds of indiscipline were watered by the nature of

the force constructed. The Nigerian Army never had to resort

Click here to view image

What existed on the Nigerian Air Force was located at Kaduna

in the Northern Region. Naval Forces were headquartered at

the port near Lagos.

to conscription to fill its ranks. Instead, it raised the

pay of privates to $46 a month (in a nation with per capita

income at the time of about $120/year) and quickly filled its

ranks with thousands of recruits, notably the uneducated from

the middle belt minority tribes; but immigrants came from

Chad seeking a better life. These untrained, unsophisticated

soldiers highlighted the shortage of skilled personnel in

specialized areas like maintenance and administration.(5)

Table III documents the concentration of Nigerian Army

Forces in the North before the war. This disparity was

probably due to political manipulation. In any event, the

structure left the Midwest State completely unprotected and

only ceremonial and administrative units in Lagos. To

counter this situation and prosecute the early Nigerian

strategy, the Army was reorganized along these lines:

Click here to view image

Army Headquarters was in Lagos and even with early growth of

the Army, it still tried to maintain the centralized

administrative control that existed before the war. No

central field control was established, and this problem was

exascerbated when the Chief of Staff, Colonel Joe Akapan,

died in a helicopter crash in the first month of fighting.

Until the last months of the war, the Nigerians failed to

exert unity of command in their operations. By the time

three divisions were formed, each operated independently. No

Corps Headquarters was established. Instead, each Division

Commander acted as a "feudal baron", competing with the other

Divisions for resources amd attention, often returning to

Lagos to conduct business at the headquarters while fighting

continued in sector. For most of the war, the Nigerian Army

was configured into three divisions:

Click here to view image

a. 1 Division had been organized around what remained

of the Nigerian Army. Representing the best trained and

disciplined of Nigerian forces, the division had about 40,000

soldiers in six infantry brigades. Although its leaders were

slow and meticulous, 1 Division never failed in accomplishing

its missions (6).

b. 2 Division included three infantry brigades and

around 20,000 troops (7). Hastily formed during the Midwest

Crises of August 1967, its lack of capable leadership and

limited experience resulted in numerous failures on the

battlefield.

c. 3 Marine Commmando Division distinguished itself

throughout most of the war. With a total strength of about

35,000 (8), this division was divided into eight commmando

brigades which executed numerous amphibious and riverine

operations throughout the war.

The Nigerian Navy was instrumental in blockading Biafra.

Though there were few ships available, the Nigerians fully

demonstrated their conceptual understanding of the need to

control the coastline and adjacent waters. A frigate, the

N.A.S. Nigeria, and a submarine chaser had been obtained from

the Netherlands in 1966. The British had provided two

minesweepers, a landing craft and a patrol craft.(9) The

Russians also sold the Federals three torpedo boats (10) and

several radar-equipped seaward-defense vessels (11) after the

war started. These last vessels were effective in canalizing

relief flights for Biafra into uncovered air avenues.

The Nigerian Air Force had not existed until 1962 and

was building as the war commensed. The British had started

the Air Force training, but terminated it when the Nigerians

unilaterally voided a military landing rights agreement. The

West Germans than assumed the program in 1963. Training was

conducted both in West Germany and Nigeria, but ended in July

1967 with the first air raid on Kaduna Airfield when a West

German trainer reportedly was killed. The other trainers

left immediately.(12) Over 100 Nigerian pilots were

qualified on trainer aircraft. Many of these pilots were Ibo

who were lost to the Air Force with the advent of war.

Regardless, the Nigerians had no combat aircraft. In early

1967, her fleet consisted of five Dakota (C-47) transports,

20 Dornier DO-27 light liaision planes, and 12 P149D

Piaggios.(13) The Dorniers and Piaggios had come from the

Luftwaffe Training Mission.

But help soon arrived; a July 1967 trip to Moscow bore

fruit in mid-August 1967 when the Soviets sent MIG 15's and

17's, as well as Czech Delfin L-29 light attack trainers

(adapted for strafing and bombing). In all the Nigerians

received about 15 MIG's and 12 Delfins during the war (14) and

hosted hundreds of Soviet and Czech technical advisors.

Egyptian, European and South African mercenaries piloted the

jet aircraft through the first part of the war. In early

1968, three IL-28 Ilyushin bombers were received at Makurdi.

Additionally, the Federals boasted two BAC Jet Provosts

(gifts from Sudan), eight Westland Whirlwind Helicopters

(purchased from Australia) and five DC-3's (borrowed from

Nigerian Airways).(15)

In total, the Nigerian Air Force represented a flexible

and intimidating factor which had significant theoretical

strategic impact on the war effort. Yet even with its

tremendous superiority over the Biafran opposition, the

Nigerians never fully exerted their advantage. In fact, the

Air Force figured prominently in two of the more negative

aspects of the conflict, the bombing and strafing of the

civilian population and the failure of the Federals to stop

the airlift into Biafra after it was cut off from every other

means of support.

The Rebel Forces. The Biafran Army grew to a strength

of nearly 90,000. Formed around the nucleaus of 2000 former

Nigerian soldiers, the Rebel Army also felt growth pains; it

was eternally wanting for experience, ammunition and food.

Overwhelmingly outmanned and outgunned, poorly led and

lacking an adequate support base, the Biafran Army still

managed to survive for two and a half years against what

easily became the strongest military force in Black Africa.

The Biafrans maintained five undersized divisions and

several special units like the Biafran Organization of

Freedom Fighters (BOFF) and the 4th Commando Brigade. Though

guerrilla tactics did enhance Biafran operations, they were

never embraced as the disparity between the two forces might

have indicated. Ojukwu, in fact, was marked as a "prisoner

of classic British tactics."(16) His methods were based on

the belief that a secure homeland was essential for the Ibo.

As such, his priority was the maintenance of an impenetrable

defensive parameter.

There was little artillery or mortars in the Biafran

Army, and advanced armaments consisted of homemade rockets

and land mines, fabricated tanks and pre-World War II French

armored cars. Desperate for war materials, the Biafrans were

often dependent on captured Federal equipment. This created

problems. Rebel soldiers would stop to pick up clothing and

supplies instead of pursuing retreating Federal troops. When

the Nigerians discovered this trait, they baited preplanned

artillery and mortar targets with military supplies.(17)

The shortage of equipment also meant that the Biafrans

were unable to capitalize on the large numbers of volunteers

which initially streamed in. Time magazine reported that one

of the elite Biafran Brigades had enough arms for only 3,000

of its 6,000 men.(18) This situation persisted until the

summer of 1968 when the French announce support of the

Biafran cause.

The Biafran Navy was essentially a non-entity after the

raid on Bonny. It consisted almost entirely of machine gun

mounted Chris-Crafts taken from the Port Harcourt Sailing

Club (19), and armed harbor and river craft. Though the

Rebels tried to obtain naval vessels, they were unsuccessful

and never seriously influenced the naval war.

The Biafran Air Force, however, evolved into a viable

institution. Twice it countributed to Biafran initiatives.

Early in the war, the Air Force consisted of:

Click here to view image

Keeping this ancient fleet in the air rapidly overwhelmed the

Biafrans. The initial value of these aircraft was the

psychological effect they created in the disorganized early

stage of the war. The bombers made harassing attacks on

Lagos and the Northern air fields, creating large scale panic

with their erratic bombing with homemade munitions. The

helicopters likewise dampened Federal fervor on the

battlefield. Used primarily for reconnaissance, Federal

soldiers soon discovered they were not safe when the

Alouettes were in the air due either to aerially supported

artillery or mortar attacks, or homemade bombs dropped from

the aircraft. They quickly learned to seek cover when the

helicopters were flying.(22)

Besides the continuing airlift, the next important

contribution made to the air war came at the end. A Swedish

citizen was moved by the suffering created in Biafra by

Federal air raids. This man, Count Carl von Rosen, decided

to get the Biafrans a countering air capability and

introduced 19 Swedish single engine MFI-90 airplanes. Each

of these trainers had 12 rockets in a pod mounted under the

wing and was capable of flying undetected at tree top level

to its targets. These tactics had an immediate impact on the

Nigerians, but it was a case of too little, too late as the

war ended before the potential of this small air force could

be realized. They were particularly effective in attacks

against fixed targets, like oil wells and equipment.(23)

The Biafrans simply were never able to match the

relative Federal might. The oil revenue with which they

expected to finance their war effort was soon cut off as the

Federal blockade was enforced. By the time massive French

aid was received, the war was lost and the aid merely

prolonged the suffering.

CHAPTER 3

THE WAR BEGINS

I need not tell you what horror, what

devastation and what extreme human suffering will

attend the use of force. When it is over and the

smoke and dust have lifted, and the dead are

buried, we shall find, as other people have found,

that it has all been futile, entirely futile, in

solving the problem we set out to solve. (1)

Initial Phase. (June-July 1967). No one heard the

prophetic words of Colonel R.A. Adebayo, Governor of the West

Region of Nigeria. Both sides were totally unprepared for

what was to come. This was the foremost lesson at the start

of the war. On the Federal side, there was no comprehension

of the paranoia which encompassed the Ibo being. Instead,

Gowon expected a "police acton" whereby the rebellious

Biafrans would be surrounded and isolated from the world;

then Biafran resistance would quickly fade and Federal

victory would be rapid--"a quick kill."

Even before the Biafran Independence Announcement, the

Federal government cut off telephone, telegraph and postal

service to the rebellious state. Afterwards, airlines,

railroads and highways were closed, and the small Nigerian

Navy prepared to blockade all shipping except oil tankers.

Even these were restricted from transit as hostilities

intensified.

Mobilization was half-hearted at best. In the North,

the Chairman of Internal Administrative Services warned

provincial administrators of the impending conflict. Limited

training in civil defense began and evacuation planning was

conducted in the event of raids on the larger cities.

Ex-servicemen, some 7,000, were recalled to active duty and

formed four new infantry battalions. The Army started

recruiting members from the local and national police

forces.(2)

After a five week lull, the first offensive actions

began. Barely qualifying as skirmishes, they marked a

Federal campaign to advance from the North on four axes with

the objective of crushing Biafran resistance and seizing

their capital of Enugu. After some initial successes, the

Nigerians began to meet increasing Rebel resistance. It

became apparent that they had underestimated the measure of

resolve of the poorly equipped Biafran Army. Also

highlighted were the lack of training and discipline of the

Nigerian Army and the difficulties they would experience due

to their long lines of communication. The offensive ground

to a halt, and the rebellion that they expected would take

only days to crush exhibited more long term potential.

The Biafrans set their strategy as the establishment of

a secure homeland for the Ibo and the development of a might

which, as Ojukwu stated, no force in Black Africa could

overcome.(3) Like the Federals, the Rebels stressed civil

defense procedures. With limited military resources, yet

driven by terrible fear, the people of the region prepared

defensive positions on likely avenues of approach, formed

local militias and secured Nigerian-owned war materials that

remained in the region. In fact, Rebel preparations began

well in advance of the actual secession date. They started

in earnest with the massive influx of refugee Ibo during and

after the September/October 1966 pogroms. Non-Easterners had

been ordered out of the region at that time, and there are

clear indications that secession was planned from that

point.(4)

The Biafrans met the initial Federal advances from the

Northern Region with full resistance. They used to their

advantage the fact that they were fighting in their home

territory, capitalizing on the availability of manpower to

hinder Federal advances. Traps, ditches and obstacles were

placed in the paths of attacking Nigerians. These only

slowed the Federals, who used their superior firepower to

saturate prepared positions and their mobility advantage to

outflank Biafran strong points. At Obollo Eke, for example,

artillery and mortar shelling began at 6 a.m. August 3, 1967,

and continued until 8 a.m. After a brief attack, artillery

preparations resumed, followed by another probe. This

alternating pattern of two hours of shelling and a probing

attack continued during daylight hours for four days before

the Rebles were pushed out of Obollo Eke.(5)

The extensive road network in northern Biafra created

flank defensive problems. After the first loses of Biafran

territory at Obudu, the Rebels planned to fall back to Ogoja.

In retreat they ran into a Federal ambush and learned just

how vulnerable their flanks were.(6) Quickly they adjusted

their tactics, moving to the flanks when armored vehicles

assaulted their lines and reclosing the ranks after they

passed. The Rebels soon resorted to hit-and-run tactics in

the form of ambushes to harrass Nigerian operations. But

they never abandoned their static defenses, and from the very

beginning the Biafrans were victims of their lack of military

experience.

One bright spot for the Biafrans appeared on July 21,

1967 when a World War II American-made B-26 bomber piloted by

a Polish expatriot, called "Kamikaze" Brown, bombed and

strafed Federal positions at Obukpa. This greatly lifted

Biafran morale (7), but offered ominous clouds for future

events. Both Great Britain and the Untied States had

rejected Nigerian requests for aircraft. By July 31 Nigerian

representatives were reported in Moscow (8) and expansion of

the war's lethality was imminent. (Note: Arms supply was a

major part of a critical issue, outside intervention, which

dominated international discussion of the Nigerian Civil

War.)

Another event which portended the calamities to follow

was the amphibious assault on and capture of the Island of

Bonny at the mouth of the Port Harcourt Harbor. This Federal

operation was important for two reasons. First, it

demonstrated a boldness, fluidity and imagination seldom seen

in Federal operations. The Bonny assault was not remarkable

in its execution; however, the operation was in marked

contrast to the "skirmishes, slow, cautious probes, and long

distance bombardments of doutful object with doubtful

accuracy [and an] incredible amount of aimless and wasteful

shooting" (9) which dominated the northern battlefields. On

Bonny a 1000 man invasion force loaded on two ships

overwhelmed a company--sized garrison after a limited naval

bombardment. Destroyed was Biafra's only real naval vessel,

a Nigerian patrol boat seized at secession; more important,

Port Harcourt, the major port and oil terminal in Biafra, was

effectively sealed off.

This leads to the second importance of the Bonny

capture. It pinpoints the failure of Biafran leaders to

appreciate the incredible consequence of losing their sea

lines of communications. They did not see the need to secure

adequate sea power before the war began and were unable to

correct their shortcoming when it became apparent how serious

the Federals were about enforcing their blockade of the

Biafran coastline. The New York Times noted at this stage of

the war that Biafra had a "better-than-even chance of

survival" ...but that it was... "clear, that the East cannot

survive for many months unless the naval blockade is

broken."(10) Instead of confronting this problem, however

the Biafrans turned inward.

The Midwestern Invasion (August-September 1967). The two

forces fought tentatively through July of 1967 and into

August, with the Federals steadily gaining ground. Then the

Biafrans, who had seemed interested only in a defensive war,

launched an attack into the Midwestern State. This marked

the turning point in the war, as the Rebels gambled on a

disastrous offensive campaign.

"We have no territorial ambitions. We do not want to

capture anybody or punish anybody. We just want to be left

alone,"(11) Ojukwu wrote. The drive into the Midwest,

however, stood in stark contrast to this claim, Biafra had

moved boldly beyond simply protecting the Ibo enclave and

seized the initiative, taking the war to the Federals. The

objectives of the strike were lightning attacks on, and the

capture of, the Federal capital of Lagos and the Western

State capital of Ibadan. The occupation of these two

capitals was expected to cause an immediate collapse of the

Federal government and an end to the war. But the way the

Rebel forces spread throughout the region, it is clear that

Ojukwa had other objectives in their advance. Among these

were establishment of internal control of the Midwestern

State and limited prosecution of the war into the Northern

State.

The execution of the plan higlighted the incompetence

of the strategic planners in Biafra. Just as they failed to

fully grasp the implications of a naval blockade, they lacked

the professional skills and imagination (and patience, and

resources) to coordinate an effective attack. The plan took

advantage of the sparse Federal forces which were thinly

spread throughout the region in small garrisons, more an

internal security force than an army. But the plan did not

correctly account for many of the non-military factors

bearing on the situation, nor did it have sufficient

flexibility to confront in any realistic sense changing

conditions.

The Midwestern State was in a precarious position, a

small, wealthy area caught between the secessionist Ibo and

the Federal captial of Lagos. In its boundaries were some

800,000 Ibo who could be expected to have sympathies for the

East. Primarily agrarian, the region was rich in palm oil,

rubber and timber, while oil was a growing resource.

One-third of Nigeria's 1967 production and one-half of her

reserves were located here. This made the Midwest a

desirable property for both sides.(12)

At 3 a.m. on August 9, a 100 vehicle column (about 1000

men) crossed the Onitsha Bridge over the Niger River. Within

hours Rebel troops occupied the Midwest captial of Benin,

while others had fanned out towards Okene (see Map IV) in the

north, Owo, also north, and Sapele and Warri to the south.

The takeover was facilitated by an insurrection of Ibo-led

troops in the region and few shots were actually fired.

Evidence is strong that Federal military leaders of Ibo

origin secretly collaborated with the Biafrans, providing

intelligence on Federal troop dispositions and coordinating a

revolt from Nigeria in conjunction with the offensive.(13)

As a result, operational security and surprise were achieved.

The inital success of the raids, coupled with an August 11

air attack on Lagos, had a devastating psychological effect

on the Federal side.

In compensation for the tremendous security surrounding

the operation, the Biafrans delayed the formation of their

brigade-sized task force, conducted no rehersal and even

withheld appointment of the task force commander until the

day before the attack.(14) This demonstrated a lack of

appreciation for the necessity of building teamwork and

cohesion in military units and entered several unknowns into

the Midwest operational equation.

a. Lieutenant Colonel Victor Banjo, a Yoruba, was

selected to be the operational commander for politcal

reasons rather than his military skills. There was a belief

that a non-Ibo leader would help gain Midwest and Western

support for the Biafran attack and in the end, help unite all

of the South against the North. This not withsanding, Banjo

ignored his principal objective, Lagos, and twice held up his

advance. At Benin he halted to "reorganize" his forces,

though they had not fired a shot. Time was lost in an

argument between Benin and Enugu over who was to be the new

governor of the region.(15) After three days the Rebels

advanced on to the west before stopping at Ore. Forgeting

that their success depended on speed, the Biafrans were

hesitant to face the uncertainty of continued advance.(16)

Lack of agrresive leadership and unity of purpose resulted

in a two week delay after which the Rebels lost the

initiative.

b. The shock of the invasion and the lack of discipline

displayed by Biafran soldiers produced adverse results. The

support expected for the Midwest Ibo did not materialize as

expected, and the negative reaction by non-Ibo in the Midwest

and West was far worse than anticipated. It evidenced a

political blindness in the Biafran leadership akin to their

military shortcomings. John de St. Horre notes that this

political blindness was "too often repeated to be a chance

phenomenon."(17)

c. The political "wheeling and dealing" that took place

in Benin over control of the region, at the expense of

military objectives, lent a suspicious cast to the Biafran

leadership. The motives and actions of all officers became

suspect because of the rumor of "saboteurs" within the

leadersip.(18) This prejudgement severely hampered command

and control in Biafra thereafter and is discussed in Chapter

d. The Biafrans probably lacked the capability to

conduct such an offensive operation. In his book, Reluctant

Rebel, Fola Oyewole details the lack of preparation for the

Midwest offensive by his company. Here is a summary of one

episode. Upon his return from a battalion field exercise, he

was ordered to form a new company at Onitsha. He delivered

his car and possessions to family members in that city and

reported immediately to his battalion. Within hours he moved

to the Midwest. His unit's mission was the capture of the

army barracks at Ugbelli. With an officer cadet as his

executive officer and no experienced noncommissioned

officers, the company was bused to the objective area. Ten

miles from Ugbelli, he stopped the column and provided a

short briefing, though he was without intelligence or

reconnasissance. Fortunately there was no opposition at the

objective. Even so, the untrained and undisciplined troops

engaged in sporatic firing which resulted in one wound.(19)

Such episodes illustrate just how unprepared the Rebels were

for the war. The vehicles used for the attack included

homemade armored cars, farm trucks and passenger cars. The

Biafran soldiers were poorly equipped, and many were without

uniforms. They were lucky to meet only token resistance from

the few Federal Forces.

From the Federal side, the Midwest Invasion achieved one

significant result. It broke the complacency surrounding the

Federal war effort, and unified the ojectives of Lagos, the

West and the North. The entire country was intimidation by

the aggressiveness of the Eastern Ibo and the response was

immediate. In a demand for Federal action, anti-Ibo riots

broke out in Lagos and Ibadan. A dawn-to-dusk curfew was

imposed at Ibadan, and troops and armored cars presented a

show of force in Lagos to buoy public confidence.

Militarily, the reaction was more substantive. A war

cabinet was formed in Lagos. Remaining Federal forces

operating in the Midwest fell back to blocking positions,

most notably to the south of Ore about 120 miles from Lagos

on the overland axis of advance from Benin. There they were

reinforced by a company of Federal Guards from Lagos. A new

unit, 2 Division, commanded by then Lieutenant Colonel

Murtala Mohammed, sent its 7 Brigade to Ore, while the 6 and

8 Brigades were placed on the northern border of the Midwest

to occupy the Biafran's right flank.

Lagos must have been reminiscent of Paris and her taxis

during the first battle of the Marne. Ground wagons and red-

and-silver buses delivered soldiers from Lagos to the front.

Six hundred soldiers were recalled from Bonny, and 500 more

were moved by rail from Kaduna in the north. The war in the

north of Biafra slowed as attention and resources were drawn

to overcome the threat in the Midwest. Nigeria's leading

playwright, Wole Soyinka, observed that "the short, surgical

police action is being conducted with blunt and unsterile

scapels."(20)

By mid-August, blown bridges and their own hesitation

had stopped the Biafrans. The very factor which had hampered

the Federal offensive earlier, long lines of communcations,

now was a problem for the Rebels. A small force from the

beginning, it was stretched too far to withstand the growing

Federal pressure.

Abruptly, the Rebel offensive ended as the Federals took

the initiative. After a single, fierce, battalion-level,

infantry battle at Foriku, just south of Ore, Biafran

resistance faded into an "accelerating retreat" characterized

by minor delaying actions, blown bridges and cratered

roads.(21) The two northern brigades were in a race to

outflank the Biafrans and cut off their retreat to the Niger

River Bridge at Onitsha. In their haste, the Biafrans left

behind many soldiers who did not receive word to withdraw and

were consequently captured. Benin was evacuated days before

the Federals arrived. The remnants of the invading force

crossed the Niger Bridge at Onitsha, blowing two spans in

their passing. The destruction of the bridge, a giant

edifice commemorative of Nigerian progress, was symbolic of a

final isolation for Biafra and a new and deadlier phase of

the war.

From the Midwest Invasion the Biafrans had hoped to show

the world that they were a legitimate power deserving of

international recognition; instead the foray ended with

disaster. The Rebels gained some food, materiel, and the

assets of the Bank of Benin which were expropriated in the

occupation. But the losses far overshadowed those minor

gains:

a. The Federals declared all out war, launching the

first air strikes of the war at Enugu, Onitsha, Port Harcourt

and Calabar among others.(22)

b. The Biafrans removed the buffer of the midwest

state. All sympathy in the South was lost as non-Ibo became

pro-Federals. Additionally, the blockade became more

effective as trade that had flourished in the Niger died.(23)

c. The loss of resources, men and materiel, in the

Midwest hastened the fall of Enugu. The withdrawal of these

assets had weakened the defense of the northern region. When

these forces did not return and the Federals resumed their

advance with a rekindled fervor, the early fall of the

Biafran capital was assured.(24)

d. Finally, the initiative was surrendered to the

Federals. With the offensive they initiated in mid-August,

the Federals began to display their superiority. The

conflict slowed to the plodding war of attrition that would

continue for over two years. The norther border was closed

by the Nigerian 1 Division, the Midwestern Region had been

clearly by 2 Division, and the Navy had blockaded most of the

sea approaches. The Cameroons had closed their rugged border

in June 1967, and the noose was slowly tightened by the

Federals.

CHAPTER 4

THE WAR DEVELOPS

(October 1967-August 1968)

The Biafrans had gambled on taking the initiative away

from the Federal forces. Pushed back across the Niger River

after the abortive Midwest invasion, they had lost any chance

of victory and had spurred the Nigerians into action. The

Federal response was a three-pronged offensive from the

north, the west and the south, while they methodically

tightened their blockade. The result was the isolation of

Biafra and the gradual collapse of the Rebel state into a

smaller and smaller enclave.

The Influence of Gowon. The deliberateness of the

Nigerian effort was indicative of the character of the

Federal leader, now Major General Yakubu "Jack" Gowon. This

occurred despite the fact that personally Gowon was atypical

of the people he led. Born into a Methodist minister's

family in 1934, Gowon was a Christian from a minority tribe

in the predominantely Moslem north. He was educated in

Nigeria and received military training in the British-

operated Officer Training School at Teshire, Ghana and at

Eton Hall and the Royal Military Academy of Sandhurst in

England. He and his counterpart on the Rebel side, Ojukwu,

had similar military backgrounds.

Both were commissioned in the Army in 1957 and served

with the United Nations Force in the Congo. After staff

college in Camberley, England, Gowon was promoted to

Lieutenant Colonel in 1963. In 1965 he attended the Joint

Services Staff College in England, returning to Nigeria two

days before the first coup of January 15, 1966; his absence

from Nigeria may actually have saved his life. In any event,

Major General ironsi took power and appointed him Chief of

Staff of the Nigerian Army. In the aftermath of the July

1966 counter-coup, Gowon was a compromise selection to head

Nigeria though he apparently was not involved in the coup.

Where Ojukuw was outgoing, openly ambitious and

charismatic, Gowon was more sedate. A man of slight stature,

Gowon was trim, dapper and polished. He radiated little of

the fire and exhibited none of the clever intelligence of his

adversary; but Gowon was stable, serious and determined. He

had the talents to hold together and orchestrate the wartime

administration of the emerging power engaged in a bitter

civil war. This General Gowon did under the intensive

scrutiny and criticism of the international media, yet he

displayed insight that tinged his leadership with

Lincolnesque qualities.(1) His moderation is regarded as

possibly the greatest single asset that he brought to the

war.(2) There was no panic in his headquarters, and Gowon

let his field commanders run their operations with little

intervention. In fact, his visits to the fronts were

virtually nonexistant; he depended on radio and telephone

contact for information.(3)

Gowon was sensitive to the fear of genocide in the Ibo

and to the necessity of rebuilding the country when the war

ended. He issued a code of conduct for the military. He

refused to authorize any awards for the conduct of the Civil

War. Finally, General Gowon invited a team of international

observers to the front to appraise the conduct of Federal

soldiers.(4)

Gowon balanced his understanding of the long term

aspects of his policies with a resolve which demonstrated his

comprehension of the short range needs of Nigeria to conduct

war. He gradually built up his forces and arms rather than

immediately acquiring armaments and munitions in bulk, thus

avoiding morgaging his country's furture.(5) Additionally,

once he decided that siege warfare was the best method to

secure victory, he applied the blockade and did not waiver

under the intense international pressure to allow mass relief

operations into Biafra. Regardless of whether his position

was morally right or wrong (considering the people who died

of starvation), Gowon maintained the commitment necessary to

direct his country througout the war and the insight to

reunite it when peace arrived.

1 Division Operations. The unit that most reflected

Gowon's cautious resolve was 1 Division which fought in the

north of the Eastern Region. Containing the bulk of the

remaining Nigerian regular prewar army, the division applied

renewed pressure around Enugu after the Midwest offensive.

Enugu's importance went beyond the fact that it was the

Biafran capital: it was a coal mining and steel town which

lay on the only railroad into the Eastern Region. As a

captial, the city had symbolic value; but as an industrial

center, it represented a major asset to the Biafran war

machine.

Characteristic of 1 Division, detailed planning and

preparation went into the operational concept for the Enugu

assault. 1 Brigade was tasked with capturing Enuku; it had

seven battalions (1000 men each) with another 1000 men

available as individual replacements. The first brigade was

tasked with capturing Enuku. The plan called for a two axes

advance from Nsukka to Nine Mile Corner and Eka, followed by

a single axis movement to Enugu.(6)

On September 10, 1967 the Rebels launched a pre-emptive

counter-attack in which they introduced their own armored

personnel carriers, pre-World War II French vehicles called

"Red Devils." Slow and bulky, the "Red Devils" were

particularly vulnerable to antitank weapons, and the attack

quickly stalled.(7) Two days later the Federal attack

renewed. It was a deliberate process as the Federals met the

typical Rebel rear guard delaying action. Obstacles were

created using craters, trenches and debris, and progress was

futher hampered by well planned covering fires on the

obstacles.

The shelling of Enugu commenced on September 26th and

continued sporatically, but in volume, until the city was

taken on October 4th.(8) The serious fighting occurred on

October 1st when Nine Mile Corner was captured by the

Nigerians. The dominant high ground, Millikin Hill, was

controlled after weak resistance as the Biafran support base

fled from Enugu and the soldiers, isolated, soon followed.(9)

The Federals had clearly demonstrated their superior

firepower with the capture of Enugu. The relatively

extensive artillery preparation was the key to capturing the

city. However, the psychological damage done by, and

resources diverted to, the loss in the Midwest (which was

cleared at the end of September by the Nigerians) can not be

overlooked as factors in the defeat at Enugu. Additionally,

Lieutenant Colonel Banjo and three others held responsible

for the Midwest debacle were executed by the Biafrans on

September 24th, feeding the suspicion of the Biafran populace

regarding "saboteurs."

The fall of Enugu highlights several problems which were

to haunt the Biafrans throughout the war:

a. The tremendous shortages of food and materiel were

exacerbated by the support base which the Biafrans developed.

Administrative directorates, completely civilianized, were

responsible for providing services to military units. For

instance, the food directorate set up kitchens behind the

lines. These cookhouses prepared food which was moved to the

troops for consumption. Throughout the war, as at Enugu,

when the Army was forced to withdraw, the kitchens were

disassembled and reestablished several days later in a safer

location. Meanwhile, the troops were without food for days

as they continued to fight.(10) By the end of 1967 the Army

formed the Biafran Army Service Corps (BASC) to help with

food distribution and other support requirements, but the

BASC often engaged in petty arguments with the directorates

over control of resources. Many of these disputes required

personal intervention by Ojukuwu and clearly showed a lack of

logistics awareness and unity of purpose in the Biafra war

effort.

b. Disorganization is also apparent in the way that

reserves were thrown pell mell into battle when the situation

was desperate. Time and again, the Federals would attack and

overwhelm their objective; thus, the Biafrans would

frantically mobilize every available resource and try to

reverse an already lost cause. At Enugu, it was the

formation and deployment of the "S" Brigade, raised to

recapture the city from the Federals. This brigade continued

resistance at Enugu for weeks until it was outflanked and

forced to withdraw. The lesson here is that the Biafran

leadership did not fully consider its operational problems.

Fighting a defensive war, the superficial, obvious

preparations for battle were made. Defensive fortifications

with concrete bunkers, alternate positions and preplanned

ambushes were planned and emplaced. Yet the leadership did

not plan for the worst case. Consequently, hectic scrambling

occurred to regain lost positions when some degree of

realistic foresight and planning might have saved precious

resources and ensured more successes.

c. Perhaps the reason that the Biafrans did not

consider the worst was because discussion of such cases would

have cast suspicion on the planner as being a "saboteur."

Paranoia was rampant throughout Biafra. Even in official

channels, the truth, if disastrous, was avoided. After the

fall of Enugu, Biafran documents, books and press releases

were identified as originating from "Enugu." Umuahia, where

the govenment moved from Enugu, was called the "Administra-

tive Center," a euphemism for capital, and Port Harcourt

later was said to be "disturbed" instead of captured.(11)

Ultimately, the air of suspicion and the lack of reality in

the precautions of the government hindered the military

capacity and caused thousands of civilian deaths.

The Federals also demonstrated patterns which were to

follow them through the rest of the war.

a. Their long lines of communications, dependence on

artillery bombardment (which required massive resupply

efforts) and reliance of armored personnel carriers to lead

combat formations, initially tied them to over-the-road

movements. This was especially true since they started the

war in the rainy season. Soon their supply lines were

overextended. This may have been a major factor for the

deliberateness of 1 Division operations. After their

cautious movement during combat, they took six months to

resupply and reorganize before their next operations.

b. The Federals did not capitalize on the use of

infantry tactics. Systemic is the word one author used to

define every Federal operation. The saturation shelling which

preceeded Federal assaults left the soldiers with little to

do other than walk-in and mop-up the various objectives.(12)

This meant that the inexperienced troops gained minimally

from each successive operation. It also allowed for greater

civilian casualties, especially as the war continued, and the

Biafrans were squeezed into smaller and smaller areas.

c. Lastly, Enugu once more pointed out shortcomings in

the Federal intelligence capabilities. At the outbreak of

the war, the Federals had inaccurately predicted the Biafran

capacity to wage war and had planned a short "police action."

The Midwest Invasion had caught them by surprise, and when

retaking Benin, Federal forces barraged the city even though

the Biafrans had vacated the premises days before.(13) At

Enugu, 1 Division did not realize in their caution that

pursuit of the disorganized, retreating Biafrans, and the

destruction of the Rebel force which was then possible, might

have brought a rapid conclusion to the civil war.(14)

2 Division Operations. Things were not all one-sided on

the northern front. At Onitsha, the Federal 2 Division was

bogged down. Its continuous setbacks there were one of the

major failures of the Nigerian Army in the war. The green,

untrained and poorly led 2 Division offered a marked contrast

to 1 Division.

Thrown together in the heat of the Midwest Invasion, 2

Division got a false sense of its own and Biafran

capabilities as the Rebel forces melted away in the

Midwestern Region under slight pressure. Securing the Region

by the end of September, the Division Commander, then Colonel

Murtala Mohammed, prepared for his next operation--the

capture of Onitsha on the Biafra side of the Niger River.

Onitsha was important because it was a commercial center with

the largest market in West Africa. Denial of access to these

resources would seriously reduce Biafran logistical

capabilities. Additionally, securing a bridgehead on the

east bank of the Niger at Onitsha would shorten Nigerian

lines of communications with Lagos. Even with the Niger

River Bridge down, waterborne movement from the main road on

the western side would greatly reduce transit time for

replacements and supplies into the Eastern Region. Finally,

Onitsha marked the route into the Ibo heartland and therefore

would take the war to traditional tribal home. The

possible psychological gain was great.

All available ferry boats in the country were collected

at Asaba on the western side of the river, and limited

special training was conducted on river crossing operations.

The Army and Supreme Headquarters advised against the opposed

river crossing, recommending instead that 2 Division should

transit the Niger unopposed, north at Idah and then attack

overland to Onitsha. Both staffs realized how complicated

this operation was for inexperienced troops with inadequate

equipment. The General Officer Commanding (GOC), Colonel

Mohammed, had his way. Onitsha was attacked with mortars and

artillery in preparation for the assault. On the night of

October 12, the Federals crossed in strength, established a

bridgehead and fanned out into the city with two armored

personnel carriers in the lead. Here, the conduct of the

operation faltered.

The undisciplined soldiers became obsessed with

ransacking Onitsha for spoils, forgetting the need for

securing the bridgehead. The Biafrans, under Colonel Joe

Achuzie, counter-attacked; the Federals were surprised, out

of position and routed. Driven back to the river's edge, the

soldiers discovered that expected reinforcements and supplies

had not arrived because of the mechanical failure of the

follow-on support vessel. The 1000-man assault battalion was

decimated in their disorganization under the Rebel fire. In

this and other crossing attempts, drownings accounted for an

excessive number of losses, pinpointing the lack of detailed

training/rehearsals for the crossings.(15)

The second crossing was tried on September 28. It

failed when the Biafrans machinegunned the boats in the

water. By the time the third attempt came, demoralized 2

Division troops were on the verge of mutiny and chaos.(16)

The Division Commander then abandoned further river assaults

and executed the plan originally recommended by his higher

headquarters. He crossed the Niger unopposed at Idah which

was under Federal control and moved slowly to Onitsha in 1

Division territory. Planning and operational security were

poor, but the Rebels were overextended and could not redeploy

in sufficient numbers to counter the 2 Division attack.(17)

At the end of March 1968, six months after the first

abortive river crossing, Onitsha fell to a two-pronged

attack, one brigade closing from the north and another

conducting a river crossing over the Niger (near the original

sites). The battle only lasted five hours (18), belying the

difficulty the Federals experienced at Onitsha. The victory

was pyrrhic. 2 Division was demoralized and largely

ineffective as a combat orgainzation. It had difficulty

moving beyond Onitsha and clearing its sector. The road

between Onitsha and Enugu where 1 Division maintained its

headquarters was closed by Rebel activity until the last days

of the war. The Division later had to return elements to the

Midwest to counter recurring Rebel guerrilla activities in

that region. One strong Rebel raiding expedition in April

1968 took Asaba and briefly closed direct supply across the

Niger.(19) Such harassment with its drain on manpower

constantly degraded 2 Division capabilities on the eastern

side of the Niger.

Two final events starkly characterized 2 Division during

this period. First, soldiers of the Division massacred,

without apparent provocation, 300 Ibo men, women and children

who had gathered in Onitsha Cathedral to pray during the

city's seige. This brutal act typified the lack of

leadership, discipline and professionalism in 2 Division.

Such incidents solidified sentiments that the Federals wanted

to exterminate the Ibo, thus hardening the Ibo resolve to

fight on.(20)

The second incident occurred during resupply operations

for the battle at Onitsha. A division convoy of over 100

trucks, led by two armored cars, was ambushed by Colonel

Achuzie's forces at Abagana, a few miles northeast of

Onitsha. The armored vehicles sped away from the convoy when

it was ambushed, while the packed column provided a

spectacular target when a petroleum tanker went up in flames.

The fire swiftly spread through the convoy which was lost in

its entirety, including almost all the drivers and

escorts.(21) Once more poor planning, training and

discipline haunted 2 Division, as the whole supply column was

destroyed in one lucky ambush.

3 Marine Commando Division Operations. The war in the

south took on a different nature. Colonel Benjamin Adekunle

had obtained permission to redesignate his 3 Infantry

Division as 3 Marine Commando Division. This was based on

the unique role the unit had played up to that point in the

war, first with the amphibious assault at Bonny and then with

riverine operations to help clear the Midwestern Region. The

new division took on the special qualities of its GOC.

Colonel Adekunle, Age 29, was diminuative and aggressive,

known to be more daring than the other division commanders.

A staunch disciplinarian, Adekunle carried a golf club shaft

or bat which he used to prod soldiers under fire. Colonel

Adekunle apparently was able to get away with this because of

the universally accepted belief that he was fearless. He was

noted for personally leading his brigades into battle.(22)

Adekunle was dynamic and innovative in his plans and

operations. In early October 1967, he put these traits to

use as 3 Marine Commando Division finalized preparations for

an amphibious assault of Calabar. Calabar was the eastern

most port on the Biafra coastline. Through it, small

quantities of materiel were still shipped into the region.

Calabar also lay on the remaining passible road to the

Cameroons. By capturing Calabar, the Federals would

interdict all land routes into Biafra and control the entire

coast, thus cutting off the secessionists from the rest of

the world except by air and telex.

A garrison of 1000 men was left at Bonny to defend the

island, whiel the rest of the division, six battalions of 500

men each, loaded out naval shipping for the assault of

Calabar. It is important to note that this operation took

all of the Federal naval force, leaving Bonny weakly

supported. The Rebels later attacked and overwhelmed the

Federal garrison which was pushed to a perimeter on the

waterline before adequate relief arrived in early 1968.

Adekunle and the headquarters at Lagos had been willing to

take this risk, because of the additional front opening at