The Place Of Armed Forces In The Emerging Regional Scene

 

By 

 

Nowa Omoigui, MD, FACC, MPH

nowa_o@yahoo.com

  

 

National War College, Abuja, Nigeria

Wednesday, January 19, 2005

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

Thank you for the invitation to present this lecture to and partake in a discussion with participants of National War College Course 13.   

 

This lecture is part of a series of lectures on the development of defence and security policy.   As charged by the Commandant, my specific task is to:

 

“a).       Discuss the global scene and relate it to the African region.

 

b).        Discuss how the regional scene may affect the formulation of national defence policies.

 

c).        How Nigeria’s increasing role as a stabilizing influence in the sub-region is affecting and will continue to affect its defence policy.

 

d).        Extent to which force structure and the associated funding should be adjusted to meet continuing national commitments both internally and externally, or extent to which foreign policy goals need to be adjusted to prevailing economic conditions.

 

e).        Give a speculative personal opinion on possible future demands on the armed forces during the next few years.”

 

There is logic behind this sequence of tasks.  Nigeria, at this point in time, is not merely a snap shot.  It is a dynamic entity that has a past, present and future.  It exists among other nation-states in the region and the world, which also have a past, a present and a future.  For military planning, this imposes a domestic as well as foreign political, social, cultural and economic context, bearing the scars and institutional memory of the past but adapted to the era in which we live in preparation for the future, known and unknown.  

 

If we accept Liddell Hart’s definition of military strategy as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy” then policy must first be conceptualized in a multifaceted “Vision Statement” by the highest legitimate political authorities of the land, reflective of the consensus of the will of the people.  Political and military aims do, of course, tend to overlap in a mutually supporting manner but the imprint of national grand strategy must be unmistakable, titrated to economic and social realities.  The last formal effort at a Vision statement was the “Vision 2010 report” which occurred under military rule.   The report, however, appears to be in the cooler.

 

Be that as it may, with the national vision as background, military strategy, or rather a definition of military aim is derived from a threat and capability analysis, encompassing all available and desirable armed forces, which in the case of Nigeria, as defined by the 1999 constitution, specifically means the Army, Navy, and Air Force.  But war is by no means the only method of achieving the ends of policy.  Therefore, it must be understood that military strategy must be cognizant of and sensitive to all other elements or instruments of national power.  In any case, vulnerabilities that have major defence implications can often be identified in sectors of government and communal activity outside the traditional Ministry of Defence periscope.  Recently, the Aviation ministry openly confessed that there were over 70 unregistered and unsupervised private airfields in Nigeria!

 

Having formulated the applicable military strategy in the context of likely threats, short, medium and long-term, the next logical step is to determine how it will be implemented, in terms of a concept of operations or doctrine, tactics and force structure.    This should ideally be rigorously tested by sensitivity analyses during which basic assumptions are varied to determine the effect of such variation on recommendations for policy.  It may be that the force planned is intended to be used in various scenarios at home or abroad, offensively or defensively, by direct operational commitment or mere show of strength.   Viewed in another way, the requirements for major theater war are radically different from those for low intensity conflict. 

 

We previously defined Strategy as the conceptualization of the military aim, in support of the vision or grand strategy.  This aim must then be fine-tuned with an understanding of how and when the highest military aim might be achieved.  “Doctrine” refers to “Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives.” “Tactics”, on the other hand, refers to the finely detailed methods used by soldiers, sailors and airmen in performing assigned tasks or “the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other.”  It is usually linked to “Technique” which describes the basic methods of using equipment and personnel. 

 

“Force Structure” refers to the shape, composition and size of defence forces e.g. battalions, brigades, divisions, boats, ships, aircraft, air wings etc.   It must always be understood in the overall context of military capability, which also includes technical sophistication, unit readiness, and sustainability.  The fusion of operational concepts, equipment, manpower and training helps to define the scale of operations the Armed Forces are capable of carrying out within the financial constraints imposed by the political leadership in light of competing national needs. 

 

These phases of the professional military input into Defence Policy formulation are guided by certain so-called “principles of war”, which as young officers, you all had to internalize from your earliest days at the Defence Academy.  Computerized operational analysis and war gaming have in the modern era increasingly supported the “principles”, which you had to learn, and apply, hopefully with flexibility, in tactical lessons.  To recap, the principles, as adopted from the British Army by the Nigerian Army, are:

 

  1. Selection and maintenance of the aim

  2. Maintenance of morale

  3. Offensive Action

  4. Surprise

  5. Concentration of Force

  6. Security

  7. Economy of effort

  8. Flexibility

  9. Cooperation

  10. Administration

 

Because sea and air warfare are primarily directed at destroying a wide variety of “targets” e.g. ships, aircraft, sea and ground targets, rather than land and forces, they are much more technology intensive than ground operations.  A key “sub-principle” of air warfare, for example, is the need to achieve “air superiority”, quickly, by focusing its attention on priority strategic targets early in the game 

 

To these lists the concept of Time must added.  Time, time-span and timing are absolutely vital ingredients of the military planning process at all levels.  At a strategic level it distinguishes what is known as the “higher direction of defence” from operational and administrative minutiae.  Those at the top of the management hierarchy of the defence sector must think in a much longer time span than those at the lower ends.    Years before a Lieutenant finds himself or herself confronting a tactical obstacle, a ground attack Pilot takes aim at a target, or a ship ammunition loader loads up a 16 inch gun, defence managers at higher levels should have made long term decisions about manning, kitting, equipment, training, supply etc.  The outbreak of hostilities or war is not the time to begin defence purchases or seek operational, administrative or logistic clarity.  It is in the context of forward planning, aided by strategic intelligence and familiarity with trends in science and technology, that victory is either won or lost.  Unfortunately, the outbreak and outcome of actual hostilities represents the only way defence concepts can be tested and validated.  Hence, the Armed Forces cannot rest on its oars.  It must remain innovative, as it second guesses and justifies all of its assumptions on a periodic basis.

 

To quote US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, "You go to war with the army you have," not that which you want.  Thus, capabilities, vulnerabilities and threats (symmetric and asymmetric) must always be subjected to vigorous debate and periodic review.  This, I suspect, may have informed the last aspect of my task today – to provide a speculative personal opinion on possible future demands on the armed forces during the next few years.

 

Let us now return to the global scene.

 

THE GLOBAL SCENE AND ITS RELATION TO THE AFRICAN REGION

 

The architecture of the current regional and international environment has been driven by certain historical events, superposed on a primordial canvas. 

 

The key events include the Berlin conference of 1884-5, which, through the General Act of the Berlin Conference, codified the partition of Africa among scrambling metropolitan European powers.   It was followed, thereafter, by a period of intense mercantile military activity resulting in the creation, by force, of the country now known as Nigeria.  This pattern was reproduced elsewhere in Africa, presaging a crisis of state formation, which would, down the road, bring about numerous intra-state conflicts in Africa.  World War I, in which Nigerian soldiers took part under the British Flag, took place from 1914-18.  It gave birth, on January 10, 1920, to the League of Nations.   The world was, however, to witness another destructive cycle of war between 1939 and 1945.  Again, Nigerian soldiers, alongside soldiers from other commonwealth nations, under the British flag, took part. 

 

After World War 2, the League of Nations gave way, on April 19, 1946, to the United Nations as a collective security mechanism.  But World War 2 did more than accelerate the demise of the League of Nations.  After the war, erstwhile allies faced each other down across what was described as “the Iron Curtain” in what became known as the “Cold War,” regarded by some as a continuation by political means of the Second World War.    It was in the context of the post-WW2 political economy and strident ideological East-West rivalries that the decolonization process occurred in Africa, culminating, in Nigeria’s case, in independence on October 1st, 1960.  

 

Initially, Nigeria had an Army and a Navy.    The post-colonial Nigerian Army (NA) traces its origins back to 1863 when British Naval Lt. Glover established "Glover's Hausas." He used the small force of runaway slaves to mount expeditions to the hinterland primarily to protect British trade routes.  From this humble beginning the West African Frontier Force later evolved and gave birth to the Nigerian Army.

 

The navy, on the other hand, was created in 1958 from the defunct Nigerian Marine Department, which was originally formed in 1914 after the merger of the northern and southern Nigerian marine detachments.  The 'northern' and 'southern' marine detachments originated from the British Mercantile Marine - the armed merchant ships of British shipping and trading companies of the nineteenth century, which in collaboration with the Royal navy, helped to colonize Nigeria.

 

It should be noted that the establishment of additional branches of the Armed forces at the time of Nigerian independence was not without opposition.  In April 1958, during the conference of the Action group at Calabar, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, one of Nigeria’s political leaders said,”We have neither the money nor the need to embark on such crazy ventures as building a Nigerian Navy and Nigerian Air Force.”   Awolowo took the position that internal security was a Police responsibility and Nigeria had neither belligerent neighbors nor territorial claims against others.  Citing national dignity, others, notably Chief Rotimi Williams, disagreed.

 

Nevertheless, the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) was formally established by an act of Parliament in 1964, following two years of quiet preparations during which cadets were sent abroad for training.  Initial training and military acculturation occurred under the tutelage of the Ethiopian, Canadian, Indian and German Air Forces.  A strong motive for the establishment of the NAF was to give Nigeria independent airlift capability for force projection and expeditionary operations, following the embarrassing experience during UN Congo operations when Nigerian units were completely dependent upon US military transports for strategic airlift.  Over the course of time, however, driven by internal and external factors, the role of the NAF expanded considerably, only to decay during the latter phase of Nigeria’s long experience under military rule.

 

Much has happened within and outside Nigeria over the past 45 years, including UN peace support operations, the formation of the OAU (now AU), frequent internal security operations, military coups, a civil war, formation of ECOWAS, border skirmishes with one or more neighbors, defence diplomatic initiatives, bilateral and multilateral regional intervention, including logistic and training support for liberation movements and various OAU and ECOMOG peace support operations. All of these activities have involved all three branches of the Armed forces to varying degrees and have been extensively discussed elsewhere.

 

From a regional perspective, Africa remains a cesspool of conflict.  I once commented that,

 

“Sub-Saharan Africa is mired in bitter ethnic feuds and has the world’s lowest growth rate in per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Similarly, life expectancy, the rate at which children are immunized against diseases and caloric-intake in Africa are the lowest in the world. Correspondingly, Africa has the highest percentage of people living below the international poverty line. In recent years, its economic performance has been the worst in the world. Africa cannot adequately feed, educate or maintain the health of its rapidly expanding population, many of whom are internally and externally displaced persons. To compound the problem, there are limited opportunities for extra-governmental acquisition of sustainable wealth. Instead, private wealth is accumulated largely as a result of access to state power. This confluence of power, wealth and social mobility within the state structure, sets up a rat race of gargantuan proportions for control of government power. “

 

As I further observed elsewhere, 

 

“In a recent landmark report to the Security Council by the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, reflected on a number of causes of conflict in Africa.  They include historical legacies such as the Berlin conference of 1885, the scramble to divide Africa among European powers (without regard for ethnic realities), and the subsequent establishment of colonial commercial and political structures designed primarily to extract resources.  Against this background, Africa became one of several locations in the world where super-power rivalries played out during the cold war.  In the setting of a central strategic stalemate in Europe, cold war antagonists tried to outflank one another in Africa, Asia and South America, using local players as pawns. 

 

As if this was not enough, the end of the cold war was associated with a rebound phenomenon, in which long suppressed rivalries resurfaced at a time of declining international focus and attention, but nevertheless fueled by excess weapons from cold war stocks.  Other external factors include economic motives on the part of arms merchants, foreign state and non-state actors (like multinational corporations).    But all of Africa's problems cannot be blamed on external factors.  Internal factors that promote conflict include the nature of power on the continent, a winner-takes-all mentality, zero-sum political games, centralization and personalization, lack of accountability, lack of transparency, lack of rule of law, lack of peaceful transitional mechanisms and absence of human rights, all of which are set against poverty, lack of education and a primordial background of deep rooted ethnic and religious mindsets.   And then we must not forget cofactors like conflict creating environmental problems such as water and land shortage and environmental degradation.

 

In a draft report on the subject a few years ago, the OAU identified certain contributing factors to 26 conflicts affecting over 60% of the population between 1963 and 1998.  These included ethnicity in Rwanda and Burundi, power-sharing in the DRC-1998, Sudan-1983, Sao Tome/Principe 1994 and Comoros 1995, inter-clan and other factional rivalries in Somalia, Liberia and Guinea Bissau, mercenaries in the DRC 1964, Guinea 1970 and Benin 1977, human rights violations under Idi Amin in Uganda from 1970-79 and cold war geopolitics in Chad 1977-80 and Mozambique 1975-92 .  In the post cold war era, however, I am attracted to the classification of African conflicts proposed by Tom Lodge: 

 

1.                  ethnic competition for control of the state; for example, Nigeria

2.                  regional or secessionist rebellions; for example, Sudan, Senegal

3.                  continuation of liberation conflicts; for example, Angola, Western Sahara

4.                  fundamentalist religious opposition to secular authority; for example, Algeria 

5.                  warfare arising from state degeneration or state collapse; for example, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Congo-DRC 

6.                  border disputes; for example, Ethiopia-Eritrea

7.                  protracted conflict within politicized militaries, for example, Congo-DRC, Sierra-Leone

 

Conflict types can be major or minor, superficial or deep-rooted, short term or long term, and they can overlap.  A country like Nigeria, for example, has a variety of low-grade ethnic and religious conflicts that result in chronic blood letting without the country actually being in an open declared state of war.  It keeps the country off balance as it teeters dangerously on the edge of qualifying as a “failed state” - unwilling or unable to function like sovereign entities in discharging basic responsibilities like tax collection and guarantee of protection of life and property. “

 

The Cold war era was also characterized by military rule in many African countries, including Nigeria.  As Decalo once observed, at any moment in time, up to 65 percent of all Africa’s inhabitants and well over half of its states were governed by military (or military derived) administrators. Institutional memory for true civilian rule became distant in many countries. During the sixties, for example, there were 27 successful coups in 13 countries in the region. Nine other governments put down coup attempts. This left only seven countries with no publicly reported efforts at forceful seizure of power during that period.  By 1989, very few sub-Saharan African countries had been spared the trauma of extra-constitutional seizure of power. Among these were Botswana, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Gabon, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Senegal, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia.   Since 1989, however, membership of this exclusive group has whittled down even further. Indeed, if one were to include serious failed attempts at seizure of power, the list of those who live in the rarified atmosphere of political and constitutional control of the military would comprise only Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, Senegal and Swaziland.  South Africa and Namibia - both relatively recently independent - may also be considered to be in this group although both have had serious internal security problems to contend with, short of conventional full-scale coup attempts. South Africa under Apartheid also witnessed extensive military involvement in decision-making particularly during the Total Onslaught Strategy of the 1980s.  

 

To a large extent the decolonization process on the African continent came to an end with the end of apartheid in South Africa, although “aftershocks” of decolonization continued to plague a number of countries.  This occurred against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War between the super-powers and the major alliances, NATO and the Warsaw pact.  The exact date has been argued back and forth but in his memoirs, former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev identified the Malta summit of December 1989 as the end of the cold war.  This presaged the failed coup of August of 1991, which brought Boris Yeltsin to power, followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991.

 

As a result of major strategic re-alignments, the post-war era has brought about numerous new opportunities and dangers.  From the bipolar configuration of the Cold War has emerged a uni-polar configuration in which the United States seeks to maintain superpower dominance.  However, counter-efforts are in play by others, notably Russia, China, France, Germany, Japan and the European Union to reconfigure world politics and economics along multi-polar lines. 

 

Contemporary Global Threats

 

Collective security arrangements are now more focused on a whole variety of transnational issues, including environmental security, immigration and customs control, smuggling, sea-piracy, non-proliferation (of small arms, mines, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction), counter-terrorism, anti-crime cooperation, drug enforcement, and more recently, humanitarian peace-support dimensions such as refugee assistance and AIDS. 

 

The recently released report of the United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change has identified six clusters of threats, which the panel recommends the world, as a community, must address. They are:

 

  1. War between States;

  2. Violence within States, including civil wars, large-scale human rights abuses

and genocide;

  1. Poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation;

  2. Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons;

  3. Terrorism; and

  4. Transnational organized crime.  

 

The panel posits that developmental initiatives will help combat poverty, while bio-security measures will help deal with AIDS and bio-terrorism, even as it builds up public health capacity.  Preventive diplomacy and mediation, perhaps backed up by defence diplomacy, should help prevent wars between States, assist in preventing unconstitutional overthrow of governments, protect minority rights and regulate natural resource access and use.  Consequences of Africa’s crises of State formation, including border disputes, are also a priority as are measures to prevent the spread and use of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical weapons.  The panel also recommended the prevention and control of terrorism, sensitive to human rights considerations as well as the rule of law.  Trans-national organized crime, dealing with money laundering, narcotics, small arms and human trafficking also came under scrutiny as well as the use of strategic minerals like diamonds to fund conflicts in Africa and elsewhere.  Of particular note, nation-states are expected to protect civilians within their borders from large-scale violence but if unable or unwilling, the international community will carry out humanitarian operations, conduct diplomacy, monitor developments and, as a tool of last resort, use force. 

 

Peace support operations, namely, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and post-conflict peace building, continue to be a prominent part of the international security tool-box.  Backed by mandates appropriate to the situation, such activities should have the capacity to deter violence, confront it if it occurs, and address the need for demobilization, disarmament, rehabilitation and reintegration.   In collaboration with appropriate organizations, State institutions should be rebuilt as the need arises.  Nation-States are encouraged, therefore, to maintain standby military and paramilitary units and build up capacity for tactical and strategic air and sea-lift.

 

The panel reiterated the need for UN organs like the General Assembly, Economic and Social council, Commission on Human rights and Security Council to function even more effectively to enhance international security, while coordinating their activities with regional groups.  Reforms have been proposed to alter the basis of membership of the Security Council and exercise of veto power.  A Peace Building Commission has been suggested.

 

National and Regional Trends

 

To place things in perspective, let us first speculate on the likelihood of the identified global threat clusters in or around Nigeria.  To do this I have constructed a Table and classified the likelihood of the listed threat cluster as low, intermediate or high.  Individual War College Syndicates are invited to do their own analyses as an exercise.  The following is my personal opinion:

 

THREAT CLUSTER

LIKELIHOOD

COMMENT/CAVEAT

War between Nigeria and another Nation-State

Low

Border tensions with Cameroon over colonial borders have been mollified but can still flare up if mishandled.  If hostilities break out they will likely be brief, constrained by intense diplomatic pressure. 

Violence within States (including Nigeria), including internecine communal conflicts, ethnic and religious insurgency, genocide, various other human rights abuses, high-profile assassinations etc.

High

Self explanatory

Poverty, Infectious disease, Environmental degradation

High

Self explanatory

Nuclear, Radiological, Chemical and Bio weapons

Low

Nigeria has a nuclear reactor at the Ahmadu Bello University under IAEA supervision.  Nigeria is a signatory to the UN Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention and Nuclear Weapons Convention treaties. However, there have been lapses in control as reflected in the return of radioactive material by Halliburton, and more remote cases of foreign dumping of radioactive waste in the Delta region. At the ECOWAS summit of June 1988 a "dump watch" alert and information-sharing system was set-up. Nevertheless, the radioactive waste management system in Nigeria remains weak.    Although Africa claims a desire to be nuclear free, waste disposal weaknesses pose a threat and other powers outside Africa with nuclear, bio- and chemical weapons may not be so restrained.

Terrorism

Intermediate

Nigeria has some nation-states in its neighborhood that may be vulnerable to be used as bases for international radical Islamist terrorist activity.  Some Nigerians have been listed as belonging to al Queda .  Nigeria has a history of non-Islamist hijackings of ships (NNS Ibadan 1967); and aircraft (Nigerian Airways 1967, Nigerian Airways 1993). Hostage taking on and off Oilrigs is common in the Niger Delta.  Just before and during the civil war (1966-67) an urban bombing campaign occurred in Lagos.  Letter bombs have been used against prominent journalists in the late eighties and roadside bombs against perceived enemies of the State in the nineties. Recently, the Anambra State Government House was attacked with a bomb.

Transnational organized crime

High

Trafficking in drugs, humans, money, small arms, Oil bunkering, piracy etc. Banditry.

 

 

That said, in the last ten years, democratization appears to have gained ground as a preferred approach to governance in Africa.   Many countries, Nigeria included (since 1999), have declared a willingness to embrace western-liberal traditions of civil-military relations, which recognizes civil supremacy over the military.  This has led to efforts at defence transformation and security sector reform with varying degrees of seriousness.  The trend has created a structural framework for defence policy formulation and implementation at least in part assisted by United States and United Kingdom funded democratization initiatives. 

 

Internal conflicts remain the overwhelming form of violence in Africa, associated, nevertheless, in some cases, with spillover effects.  War between States is decidedly rare. Regional groupings such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU) have, with or without UN or EU assistance, deployed peace-keepers to various conflict zones at various times in the recent past.  Based on an agreement between African Chiefs of defence in May 2003, the AU plans to create a joint defence force under its Peace and Security Council by the year 2010.  Meanwhile, in 2003, an agreement was reached on a regional stand-by force of 6,500 men (built around a core of 1500 men) in the ECOWAS sub-region.  Troops have been pledged but they have not, as of the time of writing, been activated.  Although these initiatives are weighed down by weak military establishments, Anglophone-Francophone rivalries, HIV/AIDS and funding issues, they will doubtless be assisted by the willingness of G-8 countries to fund the training of peace-keepers in Africa.

 

Nevertheless, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), peace accords in Angola, Congo-DRC, Cote d’Ivoire, Eritrea-Ethiopia and Sierra Leone have, with rare exception, not brought about expected regional peace.    There continues to be violence in Burundi, Congo-DRC, Liberia, Somalia, Uganda, Chad and Sudan.  A new rebel group has emerged in Eritrea.  Coups and or mutinies have occurred in Sao Tome, Cote d’Ivoire, the Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau, where the Army Chief was even beaten to death, allegedly for withholding troop wages.  A planned business funded mercenary invasion failed with fanfare in Equatorial Guinea.  What began as a failed military coup in September 2002 in Cote d’Ivoire has since evolved into a civil war punctuated by ceasefires and cease-fire violations.   In one particularly significant violation, French peace-keeping troops were attacked by Ivorian Government jets, resulting in the retaliatory destruction of the Ivorian Air Force by French forces.  Both countries had, until then, maintained a mutual Defence pact! 

 

Border incidents continue to be problematic, particularly trans-national banditry in the northeastern part of Nigeria.  Another twist in the saga has been the occurrence of violence, instigated by a self-styled “Taliban” radical Islamist group in the Northeastern part of the country.  In the maritime environment, hostage taking, illegal seizure of offshore oil platforms, oil bunkering, pipeline vandalization and local inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic violence continue to occur with mixed success achieved by Military and Police intervention units.

 

But it has not all been bad news.  The Angolan ceasefire has held, perhaps in part because of the death of Jonas Savimbi.  So has that between Kenya and Somalia over their border.   The UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) has drawn down, although the security environment faces difficulties from Liberia and a potential future threat from the reconstituted Armed Forces of Sierra Leone.  Before its final pull out, however, UNAMSIL, along with the Government of Sierra Leone, carried out a National Security Exercise designed to test planning procedures at strategic and operational levels following disengagement. In Sudan, there has recently been a ceasefire between the Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, although the crisis in Darfur remains an open sore.  Deployment of AU troops (including Nigerian units) has been hampered by a combination of factors, including lack of local capacity for strategic airlift.  While the Chadian government continues to fight with the Movement for Democracy and Justice (MDJT), it appears to have reached a deal with the National Resistance Army (ANR).   Nigeria and Cameroon have avoided open hostilities over the Bakassi dispute although the process of border negotiations following the World Court judgment has stalled recently.

 

International radical Islamist terrorism has reared its head in Africa in recent years.  As may be recalled US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were attacked in 1998.  In 2002, an Israeli aircraft narrowly missed being shot down on take off from Mombasa airport by ground-to-air missiles.  A tourist hotel in the area was blown up with a car bomb.  

 

HIV/AIDS

 

The HIV/AIDS pandemic continues to roar through Africa and African militaries.   Its prevalence is two to five times higher for military personnel than for civilians.  Its military implication as a “delayed fuse, armed forces denial” weapon is profound. 

 

As I observed elsewhere,

 

“Rates of HIV infection in African militaries may be as high as 60 percent in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo and no less but probably even more in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.  The Kenyan Army buries at least two (2) soldiers every week from AIDS.  In Nigeria, President Obasanjo announced that 11% of returnee soldiers from West African peacekeeping operations were HIV positive.   There is concern in some quarters that even senior officers have not been spared.  An unanswered question is whether these returnee soldiers will proceed to contaminate their unsuspecting spouses and girlfriends at home.  More recently the UN has made it mandatory for peacekeepers to be provided with condoms along with their rifles.  HIV screening and counseling are recommended.

 

However, while most emphasis is on recent patterns of transmission, what I find most intriguing is much more remote.  During the Ugandan-Tanzanian border war of 1979, for example, the 207th Tanzanian brigade camped and then advanced from Bugandika to Kyebe to Kyotera to Masaka and on to Kampala. This route of advance later became a well-known AIDS trail. It was ascribed to loose sexual activities on the part of the soldiers, but how they got the virus in the first place has never been determined.  Unusually high HIV rates among former guerrillas (ANC, ZAPLA, ZANLA, SWAPO etc.)  has been a source of concern to me for many years but one has never found a verifiable explanation – although apartheid South Africa certainly maintained a Bioweapon program.  Their guerrilla camps were located in east and central Africa (including Tanzania) but they all moved back home when Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa became independent.  The integrated armies of those countries (along with the never ending war zones of the Great Lakes region) now have the highest rates of HIV/AIDS in Africa.” 

 

Indeed, according to the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, in certain South African military units, the rate is as high as 90%.

 

Fortunately military establishments in various countries like Nigeria, Namibia, Zambia, Botswana and Uganda have taken steps to deal with the problem.  According to the IISS, in the Ugandan military, the HIV rate has actually dropped from over 10% in 1990 to less than 7% in 2003.

 

Regional Defence Cooperation

 

Moves toward a stand-by regional force in western and other parts of Africa have been mentioned.  In collaboration with the AU and other sub-regional organizations, the French led "RECAMP" concept (Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix) continues to train soldiers from selected groups of countries, and the US led African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) continues to function.  Funds continue to be provided for related aspects of democratization, although there have been hiccups with Nigeria over alleged military human rights abuses at Zaki Biam. 

 

Overall, the US is increasingly less standoffish in its approach to the region.  In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the United States has moved to establish Defence alliances with weak states in the African region which it fears may be vulnerable for use as a staging ground for anti-American terrorist activities.  These include the Golden Spear Force, which is an 11-nation joint task force for terrorism and disasters under the command and control of the US Central Command. 

 

Simultaneously, the US is negotiating military training, base and refueling agreements with Mali, Senegal and Uganda and has increased patrolling off the Horn of Africa by the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) based in Djibouti.  There are unconfirmed reports of negotiations for base rights in the Gulf of Guinea.

 

Brazil, on the other hand, has entered into a naval training and equipping alliance with Namibia.

 

HOW THE REGIONAL SCENE MAY AFFECT THE FORMULATION OF NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICIES.

 

All instruments of national power, including the military, must be sensitive to events in the region, and understand how they may threaten or assist the country in reaching its policy goals.  The regional scene sketched in the preceding section is part of Nigeria’s overall threat and opportunity complex, the external element of which has a domestic spill over potential.  Clearly, therefore, the Nigerian Armed Forces must adapt itself to the changing environment. Such adaptation, subject to funding, should include defining appropriate military strategy, concepts of operations, tactics and force structure to be able to respond flexibly to a range of scenarios.  The proposal for changes in the membership structure of the UN Security Council, for example, represents an opportunity for the country, which should dictate more circumspection and caution when presented with military temptations to violate international law for short term gain. 

 

One of the dilemmas of the African military is the over-emphasis on the protection of territorial integrity.  Unfortunately, however, this has not been the role for which most African militaries have, in fact been used, nor does it appear – as our table of Threat Clusters demonstrates - that it will be the case in the future.  The main utility of the military has been in non-conventional roles such as internal security, peace-operations and civic development.   Unfortunately, Nigerian military units, like many of their counterparts elsewhere continue to be primarily driven by a defence doctrine that is oriented toward conventional warfare with a traditional conventional external foe. 

 

To this end, I favor a strategic defence review that is capabilities and vulnerability based, on the basis of which modular units of forces with a range of capabilities – optimized for non-traditional tasks - should be established and maintained, no matter how small.   

 

Indeed, at a lecture titled “Peace-Keeping as a Military Operation” delivered in 1998 to Course 6 participants at this War College, Major General C. Iweze (rtd), a veteran of both peace-keeping and conventional operations, observed that the

 

“Nigerian Military was for a conventional enemy, but the type of crisis that peace keepers are faced with today has no clear boundary and the enemy is not clearly defined. Thus our armed forces need to be organized, equipped and trained for today’s reality.”

 

They should be built up, I dare say, block-by-block, in direct proportion to the likelihood of the identified threats.  The “tool box” should be broad and deep, ready for repackaging as the need arises.  Nevertheless, I propose a “just-in-time” approach to force design and logistics.  The basic building blocks of a conventional force should be maintained, ready for rapid expansion at short notice with pre-positioned logistic stocks.  

 

Given Nigeria’s weaknesses, the best way to address the increasing regional posture of metropolitan superpowers in the neighborhood is to be quietly proactive and constructively engaged.  Africa should adopt a continental consensus on the issue and dissuade individual countries from entering all sorts of uncoordinated bilateral and multilateral external agreements without first seeking a regional alternative.  Unfortunately, individual African countries may have other incentives that drive their behavior.  This is a major challenge for the AU.

 

The range of capabilities should include air, land and sea components of:

 

  1. Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement and Post-Conflict Peace Building; including the multifaceted civil-military and intelligence networks that are integral to the successful completion of such operations.

 

  1. Border Protection.

 

  1. Low Intensity Operations and Asymmetric warfare.

 

  1. Counter-terrorism (with the capability for interoperability with designated allies)

 

  1. Regional Security (with the capability for interoperability with designated allies)

 

  1. Safe haven and Evacuation Force operations

 

  1. Maritime protection (with the capability for interoperability with designated allies)

 

  1. Search and Rescue, Disaster Relief and Humanitarian assistance (in concert with other instruments of State)

 

  1. Psychological Operations and Civic assistance programs.

 

 

HOW NIGERIA’S INCREASING ROLE AS A STABILIZING INFLUENCE IN THE SUB-REGION IS AFFECTING AND WILL CONTINUE TO AFFECT ITS DEFENCE POLICY.

 

Nigeria’s increasing role as a stabilizing influence in the sub-region is a two edged sword.  On one hand, if appropriately publicized and appreciated at home, it could be a source of pride to the country and an affirmation of its perception of itself as a regional power, no matter what others might think.  On the other hand, it has serious financial and policy implications, throwing up pressures on the traditional budgeting process in a relatively poor country which has enough problems of its own to contend with. 

 

The exigencies of sudden troop deployments require approval and supplementary budget allocations from the National Assembly, both procedures that can take time.   Hence the concept of an “Operational Fund for Regional Operations” makes sense if the appropriate modalities for fiscal oversight and control can be assured.  There must also be a discussion of how such funds would be replenished by those countries or authorities that benefit from the stabilization operations of the Nigerian military.  It is impracticable to make open-ended commitments.  Conversely, when presented with opportunities to source international donors, the military must not be shy to use such access and funds for infrastructural maintenance or capacity building. 

 

A related problem is that of defining Nigeria’s role and place when operating in a multinational configuration to which Nigeria is the leading source of funds and troops.  How far can and must Nigeria go to ensure that it retains or has command?  How comfortable should the Nigerian High command be for Nigerian Troops to serve under foreign command? These questions have been posed deliberately to allow debate, since it may be that there is no right answer. 

 

The deployment for extended periods of time of Nigerian troops on regional “stabilization” assignments has effects on morale, increases the risk that troops will engage in potentially scandalous sexual activity, and possibly contract communicable diseases if not managed carefully.  It might also have long-term effects on family relationships back home.   There is a school of thought that peacekeeping troops need to be rotated every six months – a convention that has historical roots in the Second World War.  Nevertheless, more recently, a concern has been expressed by UN authorities in Sierra Leone that six-monthly rotations may in fact be too frequent because of the disruptive effects of frequent hand-over to new units on a smooth longer term peace-support operation.  Some have proposed one-year long operations.  The truth, I suspect is in the middle.  If properly funded, troops may go on 9-monthly rotations with opportunities provided for rest and recreation in “Conjugal Safe Havens” (CSH) outside the immediate operational area.  Their wives can be flown to meet with them at the CSH for short periods when they are on leave, or they can be permitted to take “Home leave” and replaced temporarily on a one on one basis by other soldiers, in order not to disrupt operations. 

 

The other concern about the effect of Nigeria’s increasing sub regional role is the fact that it has the potential to deplete available forces for internal security and territorial defence duties at home.  This creates tension in force design estimates in the Defence Policy document because of unpredictability on overall Force levels that may be appropriate, particularly given the frequent inability of the Police to handle internal security crises.

 

The “Regional Stabilizer” role must lead to an honest assessment of Nigeria’s expeditionary and force projection capability drawing from many years of experience.  This military is an old military with an institutional memory that dates back over 140 years in many parts of the world.  It needs to reach deep into the aggregate experience of the unit history of the armed forces to come up with rational plans for force design in the 21st century.  Indeed, if it is willing to reach farther back in time into traditional African military heritage there may be insights that could prove useful in this operating environment.

 

If we assume (or are mandated by Policy) that military muscle should back Nigeria’s increasing sub regional diplomatic role in line with National interests, and can be paid for, then we must begin to evaluate the establishment of a standing regional Force Projection Platform as part of a Joint or Unified (i.e. Air, Land and Sea) Expeditionary Command (built around a Brigade) which will enhance our ability to project expeditionary forces within a credible time frame.  Such a platform should have pre-packaged logistics and training facilities where designated back-up troops can transit for appropriate “just-in-time” kitting, orientation and subsequent air or sealift.  Components of the land element of the standing Expeditionary Command would, ofcourse, have been deployed within hours of an order from the National Command Authority which, hopefully, would have negotiated appropriate Status of Forces Agreement with the recipient country or authority.  Because of Nigeria’s notorious inefficiency and disorganization, I do not think an ad hoc arrangement would be appropriate, where personnel and units from the branches of the Armed Forces would be brought together on a case-by-case basis and then disbanded afterwards.  Instead the unit should be standing, and troops from other units may rotate in and out of it to maintain a system wide opportunity for continuous peace-support training through coordinated exercises with Air and Naval elements, as well as allies, as required. 

 

A variation on the above theme must be considered, given the state of advancement of plans for an ECOWAS stand-by force.  There needs to be a discussion about whether Nigeria can simultaneously commit troops to the ECOWAS stand-by force as well as an independent Nigerian Expeditionary Command (NEC).  It may be that there is a need to retain flexibility for bilateral arrangements outside the ECOWAS or UN framework, with the NEC dovetailing as a deep reserve to the ECOWAS Standby Force.  Or perhaps such an arrangement, while diplomatically attractive (as was the case with British troops in Sierra Leone), may be too expensive to take on independently. 

 

No matter how it is cut, the regional scenario highlights the importance of team building.  Just like the national soccer team, Nigerian and West African units have sometimes, perhaps unfairly, but nevertheless definitely had a reputation in the past for being outstanding on an individual basis but disorganized as a group. Operational, administrative and logistic harmony has sometimes, allegedly, been lacking in such situations.  In a complex multilateral operational environment this cannot be tolerated, particularly when time is of the essence.  In addition to purely internal efforts at individual and unit training, therefore, I propose the concept of “unit embedding.”  By this I mean conducting reciprocal small unit training, temporarily seconded to the militaries of other African nations with which there might reasonably be expected to be future collaborative operations.  Naturally, the issue of interoperability will be brought to the fore in defence procurement decisions.

 

Lastly, it must be recognized that Nigeria does not lack the capacity to write beautiful policy documents. In fact we may be one of the best at it in the world.  The problem is to implement what we conceptualize.   If Nigeria intends to play a regional role it must provide what it takes to do so and do what must be done.  Such a policy is like a language.  There is no point designing it and then putting it on a shelf.  It must be spoken or else it will not survive.

 

WHAT IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH FORCE STRUCTURE AND THE ASSOCIATED FUNDING SHOULD BE ADJUSTED TO MEET CONTINUING NATIONAL COMMITMENTS BOTH INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY, OR EXTENT TO WHICH FOREIGN POLICY GOALS NEED TO BE ADJUSTED TO PREVAILING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS?

 

To respond appropriately to this question, one must first provide a little background to Force Structure as a concept in Military operational research and then introduce defence economics.

 

It is important to realize from the outset that “Force structure”, which basically refers to the shape and size of the military, beginning with each individual soldier, sailor or airman, may mean different things to different services, different levels of any one service or different components of the various services.  It is linked to a variety of other concepts such as operational requirements, logistics, combat modeling and strategic mobility. Spatially dispersed services like the Navy and Air Force often do not see things the way the Army does.  

 

My perspective on Force Structure in this lecture will be that of the Defence Ministry, not at the service and unit level of detail which would require me to make too many assumptions about force readiness and equipment utility. What the Defence Ministry does is to identify to the Services their major combat forces and identify the various scenarios by which those forces should be evaluated and their requirements defined.  The National Assembly has the power to define the total number of service personnel and provide the funding but the military has a professional role to play in guiding the process.  

 

In the Navy, force structure tends to be based on numbers of individual ships or groups of specific functional ship types, depending on whether the navy concerned is primarily coastal or seagoing and the nature of the operation.  In the Army, which has a wide variety of units, the make-up of each such unit has to be specified with emphasis on supporting forces and projections of expected degree of unit degradation after the projected combat scenario.  The Air Force, like the Navy, also tends to be functionally modular and ties force structure to well defined target specific operational requirements. However, this may be a simplistic overview, because the Navy and Army may have independent air wings, or the navy may have troops onboard. 

 

Then there is the question of perspective.  While at higher levels planners may concern themselves with numbers of types of units, at lower levels the concern tends to be with the internal structure of component units.  For example, how many and what type of Tanks are there in the Armoured Division or how many ships and of what type are in the battle group or task force or how many aircraft are there in the wing or formation?  Other issues include the availability of support forces, time to mobilization and requirement for additional training. 

 

When it comes to analysis, the Army approach is to take the primary force specification and scenario as outlined by the Defence Ministry and demonstrate that the forces so specified are sufficient to win the war or perform the task assigned with a given support structure. The next step is to make projections for ammunition, personnel replacements, supplies, fuel, end-items etc.  Support Force analysis is time phased and is meant to estimate the level of support required to sustain the combat force and replace wartime personnel in various scenarios.  Strategic mobility analysis uses a computer model to characterize arrival of forces into the theaters and keep track of resource consumption.  In addition other factors influence Force structure, including availability of Host nation support, whether or not the operation is single service or joint, the degree to which services are outsourced, etc. 

 

 The Air Force on the other hand bases Force Structure analysis on the specification of the opposing target, including its aim point; weapon and system effectiveness against various targets; and target destruction goals.  This is based on defining the optimum weapon and platform for the task given based on cost, minimization of weapons used, and maximization of target destruction as long as the number of sorties for the given force structure is not exceeded, phasing of missions completed is done and available weapons are not exceeded. Computer modeling assists in testing various forces and structures to see which is optimal. 

 

Naval ships tend to operate independently once they head out to sea, carrying all their combat and support requirements onboard or in accompanying logistic vessels when in a group until they return to base. It is easy to see how a naval planner’s approach to force structure would differ from his counterparts in other services. 

 

The Nigerian Armed Forces at a glance.

 

Broadly speaking, according to the IISS [The Military Balance, 2003 -2004], and other sources, Nigeria’s Armed Forces number 78,500 (approximately).  There is no conscription.

 

Of this number, the Army is alleged to have about 62,000, Navy 7,000, and Air Force 9500 officers and men.  Precisely how the officers and men are stacked across the duration of their military careers is unclear but preferably the distribution should be pyramidal with many more men at the base than at the middle and many more in the middle than at the top.  This implies detailed attention to career planning, with appropriate systematic attrition at every level.

 

The Army is comprised of five (5) divisions, of which one is armoured, one is “composite” (comprising motorized, amphibious and airborne elements), and the others mechanized/motorized.  Grossly speaking, the armoured and mechanized divisions have two “core” leading brigades each, supported by one artillery brigade, one engineer brigade and one light armoured reconnaissance battalion.   To this may be added a Brigade of Guards, comprised of two infantry battalions (with support elements), and a “Joint Task Force, Bakassi”, drawn from the three services, tasked for security duties in the disputed Bakassi peninsula.  At this point in time Nigeria has about 4,000 troops outside the country on international peacekeeping duties.  Various efforts have been made to refurbish, retrofit and modernize aging armoured fighting reconnaissance vehicles. 

The Navy is presently organized into two commands, the western and eastern naval commands.  (At one time in the past, there was, briefly, a central command).  Although the state of serviceability has waxed and waned, (with various efforts at local Ship maintenance and refit) it may be observed that at one point in time or another, Nigeria, in recent times, has had up to one (1) Frigate), two (2) corvettes, three (3) missile craft, 5 or more coastal patrol boats; two (2) mine-sweepers, one (1) amphibious landing craft for 220 troops and 5 tanks; five (5) support craft; and four (4) helicopters (of which efforts have been made to revitalize the two (2) older non-operational craft).  More recently, a number of over 50 year old ex-US Coast Guard Balsam-class buoy tenders have been (and continue to be) delivered through a US assistance program, raising the number of Cat-class coastal patrol boats.

The Air Force has a Tactical Air Command (armed with up to three (3) squadrons of Alpha, Mikoyan-Gurevich and Jaguar combat aircraft along with Bolkow-Messerschmitt 105D and Mil 35 armed helicopters), a Training Command, and a Transport Command, comprised of two squadrons of tactical aircraft (including C-130s, G-222s, and Dorniers) and helicopter transports in the Military airlift wing.  There is also a Presidential Fleet, and a Maritime reconnaissance unit.  As is the case with the Naval boats, state of serviceability and air-worthiness of various aircraft has waxed and waned.  With varying degrees of success, efforts have been made (with external assistance) to refit Alpha jet and C-130 aircraft, as well as perform periodic depot maintenance and obtain back-up spares for various aircraft such as the C-130, Alpha jet, L-39, Do 228, Do128-6, ABT-18 etc.  Arguments, back and forth, have spilled over on to the pages of newspapers about the appropriateness of upgrading the aging Mig-21 fleet or purchasing an entirely new platform of fighter-interceptors.  It has been my observation that many of these arguments tend to occur without strategic contextualization.

 

At this point, let us briefly review the Defence Economics of Nigeria.

 

Defence Economics

 

Appreciating the economics of defence requires a grasp of several interrelated issues.  To start with there must be a standard definition of what constitutes “defence spending” and with the caveat that how much a given country spends on “defence” does not necessarily correlate with military effectiveness.   For this purpose, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) provides an international frame of reference.   According to SIPRI,

 

“……military expenditure data include all current and capital expenditure on: (a) the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; (b) defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects; (c) paramilitary forces, when judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and (d) military space activities. Such expenditures should include: (a) military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; (b) operations and maintenance; (c) procurement; (d) military research and development; and (e) military aid (in the military expenditure of the donor country). Civil defence and current expenditures on previous military activities, such as veterans’ benefits, demobilization, conversion and weapon destruction are excluded.” (Italics mine)

 

According to the Budget Office of the Federal Ministry of Finance, in Nigeria, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) is responsible for:

 

  1. National Defence and Security, including Defence of Territorial Waters and Economic zones.

  2. Clearance of Foreign Military Aircrafts and Warships.

  3. Defence Agreements

  4. Defence Equipment

  5. Liaison with Armed Forces of Foreign Countries.

  6. Local Forces, including Army Cadet Forces and Cadetship.

  7. Matters of Policy, Establishment, Recruitment, Finance, Training and Operations connected with the Nigerian Armed Forces.

  8. Resettlement Schemes for Serving Members of the Armed Forces.

  9. Armed Forces Development Projects.

  10. Ex-Servicemen’s Welfare

  11. War Graves.

  12. Relations with the Defence Industries Corporation, Nigerian Legion, Military Pensions Board, Armed Forces Institute of Nigeria and the Armed Forces University.

 

That said, our understanding of the economic ramifications of military spending should encompass the following questions:

 

  1. What is the amount spent?

  2. What is its percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)? The GDP is preferred because it is the best single measure of true cost in public resource terms.

  3. What is its percentage of the total budget?

  4. What are the real historical trends in defence spending, taking into account, standard definitions, methodology, actual disbursement and prevailing foreign exchange rates? 

  5. What percentage of the budget is spent on personnel and overhead, rather than combat operations, equipment procurement and maintenance, research and development?

  6. What is the size of the military, including absolute and relative numbers of officers and other ranks?

  7. What proportion of the military is conscripted?

  8. What is the role of the military?

  9. Are there “off-budget” sources of military funds, including military aid?

 

One of the frustrations one has experienced in trying to grasp the economics of defence in Nigeria is the problem of inconsistency in economic data, a problem at least in part due to lack of automation of data entry, description and analytic procedures within Nigeria, and lack of uniformity in figures for Nigeria available from international sources (like SIPRI, World Bank, IISS). 

 

According to SIPRI world and regional military expenditure estimates, from 1991 to 2000, Africa, encased in conflict, actually recorded an increase of 20% while the rest of the world (combined) decreased military spending by 11%.  Since 2001, however, following the terrorist attacks in the United States, and the military expeditions to Afghanistan and Iraq, US defence spending in particular has risen significantly, resulting in an 18% overall increase in world spending as a whole. 

 

Sub-Saharan Africa spent 2.06 to 2.96% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence expenditure between 1992 and 2002. As a percentage of GDP, Nigeria spent 0.5 to 1.4 % of GDP on defence between 1992 and 2002.  Nigeria actually spent $171 – $511 million per year at constant US $ (year 2000 value) from 1988 to 2000.  At first glance, the highest amount spent on defence during the period was in the year 1999.  The reason; however, may be that in the years prior to 1999, Nigeria, under military rule, was using a favorable dollar exchange rate in a parallel market.  Thus, the real value of monies spent on defence had been understated and cannot be directly compared with the year 1999 and after.  Another potential problem with interpreting Nigerian defence estimates is that “current expenditures on previous military activities, such as veterans’ benefits, demobilization, conversion …..” are typically included.  While this may not be important in evaluating Nigerian defence expenditure trends over time, it must be taken into account in comparing Nigeria with other countries. 

 

The table below, adapted from SIPRI, summarizes Nigeria’s defence economic profile in recent years:

 

 

 

Year

Defence spending in billions of (Naira)

Defence spending in millions of

(US dollars $)

Percentage of GDP

1999

45.4

511

1.4

2000

37.5

369

0.8

2001

63.5

553

1.1

2002

64.9

 501

1.1

2003

76.9

519

[0.9] (estimate)*

Source: adapted from SIPRI [http://first.sipri.org/non_first/result_milex.php?send] 

*this estimate comes from domestic Nigerian sources

 

However, according to the IISS, when indexed to the US dollar, with an exchange rate that was steadily deteriorating, the total defence budget decreased from N59 billion ($531 million) in 2001 to N61.4 billion ($511 million) in 2002 to N55.4 Billion ($426 million) in 2003.  Simultaneously, however, Police budget increased to N56.2 billion, more than was allocated for defence, reflecting political concern about crime and internal security issues.  Although the Army was and continues to be heavily involved in internal security duties in support of the civil power, this did not reflect in its budget. 

 

The World Bank estimated Nigeria’s GDP in 2003 at $58.4 billion, up from $46.7 billion in 2002, $21.4 billion in 1993 and $34.9 billion in 1983.  The IISS, on the other hand, projected a GDP for Nigeria of $51 billion in 2001 and $49 billion in 2002. 

 

Nigeria benefited from increased Oil prices just before and following the second Iraq war but actually deteriorated from a macroeconomic standpoint as a consequence of increasing fiscal deficit and lower growth.  To compound this, the crisis in the Niger-Delta, combined with criminal activities has had implications for the Oil sector and the national economy as a whole. 

 

The table below, obtained from local sources, outlines Recurrent expenditures on Defence (i.e. personnel and overhead) from 1999 – 2003.  They differ slightly from the IISS figures, (which also differ from SIPRI figures) at least in part because they do not include Capital expenditure. 

 

It can be surmised from unpublished historical data, however, that personnel and overhead defence costs have, in recent years, typically been over 80% of total defence spending.  Such a high ratio of recurrent to capital expenditure tends to presage even further rises over time as equipment and buildings age and operating costs rise in the absence of an infusion of domestic or international investment funds for new equipment.  Unless closely monitored, this tends to correlate with military decay.

 

Year

Approved

Total Budget

MOD proposal

 Approved

MOD Budget

Actual amount released

Defence % of Total Budget

1999

196.52

28.29

28.09

27.51

14.3

2000

230.00

67.75

32.21

36.74

14.01

2001

414.20

66.12

38.06

47.07

9.19

2002

483.00

72.44

54.11

33.71

11.21

2003

593.90

69.43

54.58

52.54

4.31

Source:  National Assembly [Amounts are approximated in billions of naira.]

 

In addition to the previous observation in the text about the declining trend in absolute amounts spent on Defence when indexed to the dollar, (which is simultaneously declining in relation to the Euro), the table illustrates a decline in the amount spent as a proportion of the total (recurrent) budget, and beautifully illustrates the discrepancies between what the Ministry of Defence (MOD) requests, what is approved by the National Assembly, and what is actually released by the Finance Ministry.  It should be interpreted, at least in part, in light of an understanding of GDP trends and inflation.  According to Nigeria’s country fact sheet,

 

“Real GDP grew 4.2 percent in 2001 as compared to 3.8 percent in 2000 and just 1.1 percent in 1999. The inflation rate in 2001 was 12.0 percent, remaining in the same range as in the previous two years. However, a still-unresolved fiscal policy dispute between the President and the legislature threatens to reignite inflationary financing of government deficits. The legislature increased the spending levels in the 2002 budget by more than one-third above the levels proposed by the President. If that budget were actually implemented, the deficit would be in the eight percent of GDP range, far beyond the level consistent with continuing macroeconomic stability.” [http://biz.yahoo.com/ifc/ng.html]

 

During the planning process for a future budget, the Finance Ministry typically sets budget targets or spending limits when it requests for budget projections from individual ministries.  It is then up to individual government units, including the Armed Forces, to “fight” for more money if necessary, by lobbying appropriate organs of government and other stake-holders.  In the case of the Defence sector, this practice dates back, in the United Kingdom, from which Nigeria has drawn civil service traditions, to the Plowden Committee report of 1961.  The results of the government’s annual survey of public expenditure became the primary determinant of defence policy, rather than prevailing or projected political, social and/or foreign policy considerations.  More recent UK strategic defence reviews have tried to incorporate a greater degree of sensitivity to foreign policy considerations but the baggage of economic considerations remains considerable. 

 

One major reason why foreign policy and defence budgeting tend to diverge in real time is because of the different time frames in which they function.  The relative short electoral life span of specific administrations imposes a somewhat myopic constraint on foreign policy planning while the Defence establishment typically looks far more distantly into the future. The more consistent successive political administrations are in their foreign and defence policy pronouncements, the less likely there will be major changes in long term defence procurement decisions with attendant financial losses.

 

Nevertheless, irrespective of what the National Assembly approves (which is Law), the same Finance Ministry under the current dispensation in Nigeria wields a sword of Damocles over what it actually releases based on cash-in-hand or other as yet unqualified factors.  Indeed, in 2003, after he opted out of the second-term cabinet of the Obasanjo government, a one-time Minister of Defence (Lt. Gen. TY Danjuma (rtd)) openly complained of his frustrations as Defence Minister with the Ministry of Finance and what he referred to as a “cabal” within the regime. 

 

It is in this highly labile context, for the purposes of this presentation, that two specific approaches to the situation have been identified, namely,

 

a).        Force structure and the associated funding should be adjusted to meet continuing national commitments both internally and externally, and

 

b).        Foreign policy goals need to be adjusted to prevailing economic conditions.

 

These approaches are not mutually exclusive.  Indeed, the very essence of a strategic defence review is to carry out both tasks, guided by the constitutional imperative that the Federation shall “equip and maintain the armed forces as may be considered adequate and effective”.  Either way, as we have previously observed, political leaders and managers of “the higher direction of defence” typically expect “more bang for the buck” supposedly by increasing internal defence efficiencies.  Unfortunately, the only true test of military effectiveness is performance in war, less so during military operations other than war.

 

What are Nigeria’s “continuing national commitments”?

 

As I pointed out earlier, the entire process of defence policy review has to be reciprocal, top-bottom and bottom-up.  “Continuing national commitments both internally and externally” are defined at a bare minimum by constitutional prerogatives and fine tuned by expressly stated grand strategic policy modified as socio-economic circumstances warrant.  What then are Nigeria’s “continuing national commitments”?

 

In the absence of a “Vision Statement”, we must fall back to the Constitution. 

 

According to the 1999 constitution (Part III, Section C, 217 (2)), they are:

 

“(a) defending Nigeria from external aggression;

 

(b) maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea, or air;

 

(c) suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly; and

 

(d) performance such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.”

 

Since 1999, however, the National Assembly has not formally prescribed “such other functions” although other sections of the Constitution refer to Nigeria’s commitment to its international obligations.   For example, the preamble says:

 

“We the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

 

Having firmly and solemnly resolved:

 

To live in unity and harmony as one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign nation under God, dedicated to the promotion of inter-African solidarity, world peace, international co-operation and understanding. “ (italics mine)

 

Furthermore, under fundamental objectives and directive principles of State Policy, Chapter II (19) states:

 

“The foreign policy objectives shall be -

 

(a) promotion and protection of the national interest;

 

(b) promotion of African integration and support for African unity;

 

(c) promotion of international co-operation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations and elimination of discrimination in all its manifestations;

 

(d) respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication; and

 

(e) promotion of a just world economic order.” (Italics mine)

 

It is important to note that although the various sections quoted above are individually clear and self-explanatory, with implications for regional force projection and multilateral force inter-operability, there is no explicit statement in the 1999 constitution, defining the military support of diplomatic initiatives as a constitutional role of the Nigerian Armed Forces. However, set against the background of many years of regional involvement dating back to the first republic, there have been ad-hoc “parliamentary approvals” for the deployment of Nigerian troops outside its borders by the President and C-in-C.   What is unclear is the extent to which such ad-hoc approvals have been accompanied by appropriately legislated and released supplementary funds either independently or as a complement to internationally sourced financial support. 

 

At this point, the seriousness of the lack of consistency in Nigerian economic data earlier alluded to, the volatility of Oil markets, and the world economic picture are brought into sharp relief as we attempt to define “prevailing economic conditions” as an objective mechanism for adjusting funding for force structure to “meet continuing national commitments both internally and externally.”  For example, to do any kind of planning, we must be able to make rational projections of long term trends and key economic ratios based on Trade, Domestic savings, Investment and Indebtedness.  A comparison of such measures over time as outlined by the World Bank is as follows:

 

Long Term trends in Nigeria’s Economy (http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/nga_aag.pdf)

 

1983-93

1993-03

2002

2003

2003-07

 

Average annual growth (%)

GDP

4.9

2.9

1.5

10.7

5.0

GDP per capita

1.9

0.3

- 0.7

8.4

2.7

Exports of goods and services

4.4

2.1

- 11.1

32.4

4.5

 

Quite apart from the domestic political environment and its intricacies, it is easy to see how and why Nigeria, which, based on its GDP per capita and a variety of other indices of poverty, is a poor country, tends to stumble from year to year in a “fire-brigade” approach to doing things. 

 

Nevertheless, the current approach to budget planning based on an initial arbitrary budget ceiling for “Defence” and other sectors may be too simplistic, driven, not by an objective process of vulnerability, threat and capability analysis but by knee-jerk financial reaction to subjective perceptions of need influenced by all sorts of domestic and international factors.  A deeper analysis of why overall GDP growth is not encouraging may reveal peculiar security issues related to critical infrastructure sabotage, strategic resource revenue losses as well as a whole variety of issues linked to holistic human security.   It may be that paradoxically, an increase in Defence spending may contribute to nurturing the security environment that is so necessary to economic development, if “Defence” can be understood in more expansive terms and imaginative ways found to fund it.  This approach would require mobilizing stakeholders, agreeing on a plan for defence and security and then lobbying the National Assembly and Executive for implementation. 

 

Before I respond directly to the question posed to me at the outset, therefore, which was to describe the “extent to which force structure and the associated funding should be adjusted to meet continuing national commitments both internally and externally, or extent to which foreign policy goals need to be adjusted to prevailing economic conditions”, let me suggest a syndicate exercise using the approach outlined by Colonel Rocky Williams, that Force Design Logic should be combined with open-ended consultation.  His approach (which I have modified slightly) lists the following steps:

 

  1. Determine Nigeria’s national interests, domestic and foreign, adjusted to the local economic and social environment, regional and world scene.

  2. Identify how various instruments of government (military and non-military) can be used to achieve these interests.

  3. Quantify the agreed objectives by defining the appropriate roles for the armed forces in particular.

  4. Each such role should then be stratified into tasks that can actually be carried out by the military (based on its state of readiness) in support of the national objectives.

  5. On the basis of the tasks identified above, options for force structure (as previously discussed) should be suggested by the military.

  6. It is at this point that the required resources should be calculated and negotiated between the military, the executive arm of government, various stakeholders in civil society, and the National Assembly.

 

The significance of this logical approach to force design can be better appreciated when it is realized that even as this lecture is being delivered, plans are afoot in the National Assembly to set up a “Coast Guard” as an armed forces entity separate from the Navy.  Given all the problems of the Navy as presently constituted, its inability to optimally carry out expected roles and tasks, and the already huge percentage of the declining Defence budget allocated to personnel and overhead, the extent to which the proponents of the bill to create an additional bureaucracy have actually thought through the financial and military implications of the bill, considered alternative approaches, and obtained buy-in from appropriate stake-holders is unclear. 

 

Integrating Force Structure, Funding, and Foreign Policy Goals

 

As we noted previously, the very high ratio of recurrent to capital expenditures for defence creates a fiscal slippery slope of ever increasing operating costs for aged equipment and facilities from which it can be difficult to extricate the military without massive infusion of new investments. The situation can be ameliorated somewhat by cutting back the size of the military in exchange for a smaller, presumably more efficient system.  The dilemma, however, is how to adapt such cut backs to the increasingly fragile domestic and external security environment.

 

In my view, Nigerian Armed Forces structure should, on the basis of our previous discussion of the world and regional scene, be specifically tailored to ensure the following capabilities, no matter how small, in a modular “just-in-time” configuration that can be dynamically repackaged as the situation warrants:

 

Capability/Task

Suggested Types of Units

Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement and Post-Conflict Peace Building; including the multifaceted civil-military and intelligence networks that are integral to the successful completion of such operations.

Multi-capable Light Infantry (including integrated capacity for flexible airborne, marine, motorized and mechanized deployment as the situation dictates); Helicopter-borne rapid reaction force; Air-portable light armour (wheeled and tracked), medium all terrain artillery and engineer support units.  Integrated civil-military networks (with capacity for joint operations with paramilitary units), Intelligence, military/civic Police and integrated logistic cells – under joint command.

 

Offshore forward deployed Hospital ship for casualty evacuation along the West African coast.  Rear Referral Medical center of Excellence for strategic evacuation.

 

Light ground attack aircraft, helicopter gun ships

Border Protection.

Border Guards (Constabulary) with capability for interoperability with Customs, Immigration and Police. Light air patrol unit.

Low Intensity Operations and Asymmetric warfare.

Multi-capable Light Infantry (including integrated capacity for flexible airborne, marine, motorized and mechanized deployment or insertion); Helicopter-borne rapid reaction force; Air-portable light armour (wheeled and tracked), medium all terrain artillery and engineer support units. Integrated civil-military networks (with capacity for joint operations with paramilitary units), Intelligence, public relations, military/civic Police and integrated logistic cells – under joint command. Light air patrol unit.

Counter-terrorism (with the capability for interoperability with designated allies)

Special Forces (Air, Land and Sea elements) including hostage rescue teams

 

Hazardous Materials (HazMat) teams

Regional Security (with the capability for interoperability with designated allies)

Expeditionary Force (see text)

Safe haven and Evacuation Force operations

Military Sealift and Airlift units

Combined Infantry/Engineer/

Air-defence unit

 

Integrated civil-military networks (with capacity for joint operations with paramilitary units), Intelligence, public relations, military/civic Police and integrated logistic cells – under joint command. Light air patrol unit.

Maritime protection (with the capability for interoperability with designated allies)

Integrated coastal patrol units (naval, maritime air, marine infantry, and special forces)

Search and Rescue, Disaster Relief and Humanitarian assistance (in concert with other instruments of State).

 

Military Airlift /Search & Rescue unit

Combined Infantry/Engineer units with all terrain capability under direction of National Emergency Management Agency; Integrated civil-military networks (with capacity for joint operations with paramilitary units), Intelligence, public relations, military/civic Police and integrated logistic cells – under joint command.  Military Center of Medical Excellence.

 

Psychological Operations and Civic assistance programs

Intelligence, public relations, and Engineer support units

 

It is only after a careful bottom-up appraisal of the requirements for coverage of ground, air, waterways and sea-lanes that the overall size, number and location of Army Divisions, Air and Naval Commands (and Joint/Unified commands) should be determined.  Nothing should be taken for granted.  For historical reasons, there appears to be more colonial regional politics than rational operational requirement in the way Army Divisions, Air and Naval Commands are currently disposed. 

 

Furthermore, a strategic investment needs to be made to beef up the technical capabilities of strategic intelligence, signals, engineer, ordnance and logistic units.  Opportunities for closer defence integration with the National Space Agency should be explored because of the force-multiplier effect of satellite intelligence.

 

Funding

 

I have expressed concern about the current approach to Nigerian defence budgeting, which begins with an arbitrary defence-spending limit and then works backwards to “wherever it may end.”  Without an overhaul or modification of the approach we can never be certain that what we spend on defence is rational.  It is already evident that Nigeria spends less on defence, as a percentage of GDP, than most countries in the world, and, even as the internal security and regional expeditionary demands are increasing, defence spending in real terms is actually decreasing.  I do acknowledge, however, that when corrected for GDP per capita, the relative degree of proportionality of monies spent on defence versus social welfare adjusted for national poverty is better appreciated.  The questions of corruption and the efficient utilization of available resources also need to be kept in mind, knowing the Nigerian environment. 

 

Nevertheless, in addition to concerns about the top-down mentality of budget planning, there are also disadvantages in the way budgets are negotiated purely on the basis of geographic ministries, rather than functional tasks that may, in fact, be shared, by more than one ministry or government department.  Security, for example, is by no means exclusively the business of the Ministry of Defence.  In fact when viewed holistically, every government department is, at some level, concerned with security. 

 

Take the issues of pipeline vandalization, Oilrig seizure, Oil Tanker sabotage and smuggling, for example.  These are nebulous crimes with strategic economic and security implications, carried out not by some foreign invader, but by citizens, sometimes in collaboration with foreigners, for a variety of motives.  They do not neatly fall under any of the constitutionally mandated roles of the military, to defending Nigeria from “external aggression”, “maintain its territorial integrity”, “secure its borders from violation on land, sea, or air” or “suppress insurrection.”  However, limited resources allocated to the military for its traditional roles tend to be diverted for use in combating these problems when the military is called upon to assist.  Such criminal activities directly impact national development and, left unchecked will bring social welfare programs in the country to ruin. 

 

Such a budget item ought to be functionalized under, the title of, for example, “security of critical infrastructure” or “protection of strategic resource chain”. Monies for such operations carried out by any combination of government agencies, including the military, should come from a small “protection tax” deducted at source from the proceeds of that resource.  One (1%) to Five (5%) of Oil revenues could easily fund purchase and maintenance of air, land and sea security/defence equipment and fund operational costs of securing the Oil fields, pipelines, and Oil tankers. When the potential savings to the country in lost revenues are considered, this tax pales in significance.  Although the motive is not the same, there is precedence for the idea in countries like Chile, which has a Copper law.  However, this is not to suggest that the idea has no disadvantages if wrongly implemented, or that government should not be more alive to its political responsibilities to ensure social justice in the Niger-Delta. 

 

Other avenues for improving the funding situation of the defence sector include exportation of Nigerian made weapons, imaginative use of international peace-keeping opportunities (as has been demonstrated by Ghana and other countries), charging fees to a small number of civilian applicants for dual-use educational programs at the Armed Forces University and Corps Schools (like Supply and Transport, Electrical and Mechanical Engineers etc.), contribution to national development via involvement of specialized military units (like Army Engineers) in civic assistance programs and open competitive bidding for private and governmental developmental projects and security consulting.  The Naval dockyard can commercialize some of its maritime maintenance and refitting capabilities, as can the Air Force for civil aviation.  Even now, one hopes that the Air Force is appropriately reimbursed by the Presidency for its role in managing the Presidential Air Fleet.  If at some point in the future, the National Space Agency were transferred to the NAF/Ministry of Defence, it would also open up opportunities for commercial applications. There is no automatic guarantee that any of these concepts would work, but they can certainly be given a try. We need to “think outside the box.”

 

Foreign Policy Goals

 

As noted above, the 1999 constitution betrays how expansive and ambitious Nigeria’s foreign policy goals are.  Unfortunately, no country, no matter how rich, can set limitless foreign policy goals for itself.  There has to be prioritization, matching expectations and goals to resources and relevance to national interests.  Hard choices must be made.  Given the uncertainties in fiscal forecasts of long-term economic indicators and Nigeria’s state of indebtedness, an honest appraisal of foreign policy goals has to be undertaken.  I have previously argued elsewhere, for example, that unilateralism in the sub-region is not fiscally prudent, given our circumstances.  

 

Whether by deterrence or offensive deployment, at home or abroad, the Armed Forces are not the only means by which foreign policy goals can be achieved.  Indeed, the 1999 constitution does not expressly state that the armed forces are mandated to back up foreign diplomatic initiatives in the absence of an Act of the National Assembly.  Although initially tempted to seek a military solution to the Sao Tome coup, Nigeria and other countries eventually used non-violent multilateral diplomatic pressure to reinstate the ousted leader of that country. 

 

Indeed, diplomatic approaches can be taken a step further, by optimizing the use of pre-emptive diplomacy, guided by strategic intelligence, to prevent progression to full-scale conflict requiring deployment of military forces. 

 

In any case, the specific extent to which foreign policy goals need to be adjusted to prevailing economic conditions is a judgment that is best arrived at after a process of open consultation as recommended previously. Such rationalization of goals is likely to affect, not just the deployment of combat units in support of diplomacy, but also defence diplomatic infrastructure and programs.  Under financial pressure, Nigeria has already begun the process of rationalizing not just the number of foreign missions, but also the number of Defence Attaches abroad. 

 

POSSIBLE FUTURE DEMANDS ON THE ARMED FORCES

DURING THE NEXT FEW YEARS

 

Finally, let me end this presentation by speculating on possible future demands on the armed forces during the next few years.  It should be evident by now that what I am likely to speculate will be based on premises established earlier during the discussion.

 

To arrive at my “informed” speculation, therefore, let us revisit the threat clusters we summarized under “National and Regional Trends” above and recall our discussion about “Nigeria’s increasing role as a stabilizing influence in the sub-region”.

 

Of the major threat clusters I opined that the most likely (in no particular order) were:

 

  1. Violence within States (including Nigeria), including internecine communal conflicts, ethnic and religious insurgency, genocide, various other human rights abuses, high-profile assassinations etc.

 

  1. Poverty, Infectious disease, Environmental degradation, and

 

  1. Transnational organized crime

 

Furthermore, I speculated that “Terrorism” was of intermediate likelihood, while “War between Nigeria and another Nation-State”as well as “Nuclear, Radiological, Chemical and Bio weapons” were of the lowest likelihood.

 

It would appear logical, therefore, to conclude that over the next few years, possible future demands on the Armed Forces would encompass a variety of “operations other than all-out inter-state war.” Such may include,

 

  1. Logistic and “combat” support to domestic security agencies for Internal Security and “Critical Infrastructure Protection” in various parts of Nigeria, including the maritime shelf.  This will involve low-intensity operations and asymmetric “warfare.” 

 

  1. Resisting the temptation to overthrow constitutional order in Nigeria, for whatever reason, by whatever faction.  Any country with a past history of coups must always contend with the possibility of a future coup. When poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation intersect with widespread communal violence, transnational organized crime, poor economic growth indicators and a crisis of transition of political power, coup indicators take on added meaning.    

 

  1. Regional peace-operations. I am particularly concerned about warning signs from Sierra Leone, where, after the final departure of UNAMSIL, there could be trouble.  Low-grade intractable conflict and the sheer relative number of peace operations on the African continent strongly indicate that Nigeria, as a regional stabilizer, will be involved one way or another.

 

  1. Prevention and Treatment of HIV/AIDS.

 

  1. Less likely, but still possible, would be a demand for the Armed Forces to either share intelligence about international terrorism, or take direct part, alone or in a multilateral configuration, in counter-terrorist operations, including hostage rescue and bomb disposal.  While Nigeria itself may not be the target, it is rich in potential foreign targets and must, therefore, be vigilant lest she be seriously embarrassed.  This will require coordination with other arms of government.  A situation may also arise in which a foreign power, concerned about “terrorist” activities or breakdown in law and order at some location within Nigeria, and unwilling or unable to conduct joint operations with the Nigerian military, chooses to attack the target herself either with stand-off cruise missiles, high altitude bombing or a special forces operation.  Linked to this could be a safe-haven and evacuation operation for its citizens in Nigeria, as occurred in Cote D’Ivoire through French proxies. 

 

  1. War between Nigeria and another Nation-State” is highly unlikely between Nigeria and most of her neighbors. However, if border tensions with Cameroon are either inadvertently mishandled or deliberately exploited for mischief, a short intense border skirmish or limited conventional war is possible, which would be rapidly constrained by international diplomatic pressure.  This is by no means inevitable, since the legal and diplomatic framework for resolution already exists [International Court of Justice]. 

 

  1. Radiological weapons, (i.e. “dirty bombs”), can be made by motivated combatants from careless handling of existing radio-materials within the country or via importation through lax customs and border checkpoints.  The Armed Forces must develop and rehearse the capacity to deal with such a Hazardous Materials crisis if it occurs.  Major Chemical, Biological and Nuclear war is plainly unlikely although terrorist groups operating in the low-security climate of the African backyard may deploy such weapons.

 

Thank you.


 

 

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  2. ADDITIONAL READING

 

Hartley, Keith; Sandler, Todd. The Economics of Defence Spending: An International Survey. Routledge, 1990. 

 

Hartley K and Sandler T. "Defence and Peace Economics: A Ten-Year Retrospective", Defence and Peace Economics, 11,1, pp 1-16, 2000

 

Hartley K and Sandler T (eds). "Handbook of Defence Economics", Handbook in Economic Series, North Holland, 1995.

 

Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods

by H. John Poole, Ray L. Smith (Foreword). Posterity Press (MD) (October, 2004).

 

Combat Leader's Field Guide (Combat Leader's Field Guide)

by Brett A. Stoneberger. Stackpole Books; 12th edition (February 1, 2000).

 

Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle

by Stephen Biddle. Princeton University Press. 2004.

 

The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare Against Civilians

by CALEB CARR. Random House Trade Paperbacks; Random Hou edition (March 11, 2003).

 

Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War

by Robert Coram. Little Brown, USA. 2002.

 

Leadership: The Warrior's Art 

by Christopher D. Kolenda, et al. Army War College Foundation Press (July 1, 2001).

 

Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age

by Peter Paret (Editor), Gordon A. Craig (Editor). Princeton University Press (March 1, 1986).

 

Special Forces Guerrilla Warfare Manual

by Wimberley Scott.  Paladin Press; Reissue edition (March 1, 2000).

 

Terrain and Tactics (Contributions in Military Studies)

by Patrick O'Sullivan. Greenwood Press (September 30, 1991).

 

Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton

by Martin van Creveld. Cambridge University Press (December 12, 1979).

 

The Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War

by Norman Friedman.  Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, ©2000.

 

The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy

by Russell Frank Weigley. Indiana University Press paperback ed edition (September 1, 1977).

 

On War 

by Carl von Clausewitz. Penguin Books; Abridged Ed edition (June 1, 1982).

 

The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future (Strategy and History Series)

by David J. Lonsdale. Taylor & Francis. 2004.

 

Airland Combat: An Organization for Joint Warfare

by Thomas A., III Cardwell. Maxwell AFB, AL, Air University Press, 1993.

 

Ayers, James R. Military Operations Other Than War In The New World Order: An Analysis of Joint Doctrine for the Coming Era. Wright Patterson AFB, OH, Air Force Institute of Technology, May 1996.

 

McKnight, Clarence E. Control of Joint Forces: A New Perspective. Fairfax, VA, AFCEA International Book Press, 1989

 

DeGovanni, George. Air Force Support of Army Ground Operations: Lessons Learned During World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Carlisle Barracks, PA, Army War College,  March 1989

 

Holmes, James M. The Counterair Companion: A Short Guide to Air Superiority for Joint Force Commanders. Maxwell AFB, AL, April 1995.

 

Mahan on Naval Warfare: Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan

by Alfred T. Mahan, Allan Westcott. Dover Publications Inc. 2005.

 

Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare

by Robert M. Citino. Univ. Press of Kansas. 2004.

 

A War of a Different Kind: Military Force and America's Search for Homeland Security

by Stephen M. Duncan. Naval Institute Press (April 1, 2004).

 

The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study

by Douglas J. Murray, Paul R. Viotti (The Johns Hopkins Univ. Pr. Paperback - August 1, 1994)

 

Defence Policy and the Royal Air Force, 1964-1970 (Royal Air Force Official Histories)

by Anthony S Bennell, Sebastian Cox (Hardcover - May 1, 2004)

 

European Union and National Defence Policy (State and the European Union)

by Anand Menon (Editor), Jolyon Howarth (Editor) (Hardcover - May 1, 1997)

 

British Defence Policy: Striking the Right Balance

by John Baylis. Palgrave Macmillan. 1989.

 

Science and Mythology in the Making of Defence Policy

by Margaret Blunden, Owen Greene. Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989.

 

To Live in Peace: Australia's Defence Policy

by Michael O'Connor (Melbourne University Press. Paperback - May 1, 1986)

 

British Defence Policy since 1945 (Documents in Contemporary History)

by Ritchie Ovendale. Manchester University Press. 1994.

 

Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century (School of Policy Studies)

by Douglas Bland, et al (McGill-Queens University Press. Paperback - April 1, 2004)

The Government's Defence Policy Discussion Paper: Issues and Directions Derek Woolner, Gary Brown, Dr Gary Klintworth. Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
15 August 2000. http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/2000-01/01cib02.htm

Gregory, S., 2000, "The French Military in Africa: Past and Present", African Affairs, Vol.99, pp.435-448.

 

French Defence Policy into the Twenty-First Century

by Shaun Gregory (Palgrave Macmillan. Hardcover - November 4, 2000)  

Modern Chinese Defence Policy: Present Development, Future Directions

by Rosita Dellios. St. Martin's Press - March 1990.

 

"The Processes of Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa" - Omitoogun, W., SIPRI Yearbook 2003, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 261-278.